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Abstract 
 
As the role of technology within warfare continues to increase, it is important to investigate whether 
or not the consequences of these weapons are being adequately considered. The use of new weapons 
technologies, such as Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles and Precision Guided Munitions, have been 
both praised and condemned within the war in Afghanistan. Although praised as saving civilian lives 
due to the precision capabilities of the weaponry there are consistent civilian deaths attributed to these 
weapons systems. This study examines debates regarding new weapons technologies that have been 
utilised during the war in Afghanistan. Current literature regarding emerging weapons technology is 
examined in order to identify key debates. The literature was recognised as falling predominantly 
within three perspectives - strategy, law and ethics.  By identifying the key debates within each 
perspective it is possible to identify where these debates overlap or diverge. This research concludes 
that the introduction of counterinsurgency strategy to modern warfare has led to an increasing concern 
with the ethical and legal dimensions of the debate surrounding new weapons technology.
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
During the war in Afghanistan a variety of new weapons technologies have been implemented. These 
weapons technologies have created new and unique challenges to those who work in the fields of 
strategy, law and ethics. Modern warfare has been deemed ‘war in the age of intelligent machines’ 
and is discussed and debated by both academics and in the global media (Owens 2003: 601). It is 
important that the effects and consequences of new weapons are analysed due to the rapid nature of 
their development. This thesis will look at the information and discussion that is available in regards 
to new weapons technology by evaluating contributions to the strategic, legal and ethical debates that 
are currently taking place globally. This is done in order to provide an overview of the variety of 
perspectives on the implementation and regulation of new weapons technologies and also to 
understand where the points of overlap and divergence between these different fields are. Historians 
call the isolation of disciplines “tunnel history” where each perspective merely draws on its own 
traditions and assumptions without looking for input from other fields (Smith 2002: 355). Through an 
analysis of the strategic, legal and ethical perspectives surrounding the use of new weapons 
technologies, I aim to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the effects and consequences 
that they entail.  
 
The weapons technology that will be discussed in this thesis has been limited to Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles (UAVs), Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV)
1
 and Precision Guided Munitions 
(PGMs). These technologies have been selected due to the significant impact they have had on 
modern warfare and the amount of controversy they have created. This controversy has especially 
been in response to lethal UCAV attacks, which have been described as “[i]llegal, immoral and 
strategically flawed” (Ezzatyar and Kabraji 2010). It has been argued that typically a preoccupation 
with the capabilities of new weapons technology takes precedent over investigation into the socio-
political consequences of the changing face of warfare (Beier 2003: 411). This research will not focus 
on the capabilities of such developing weaponry but rather on the debates and consequences that have 
arisen from their implementation in the conflict now taking place in Afghanistan and Pakistan.  
 
                                                     
1
 UCAVs have a number of terms used to describe them. I have chosen to call them UCAVs as this term may be familiar for 
readers. Other names include Remotely Operated Aircrafts (as it emphasises the human element of control) (Vogel 2010: 
102), Drone, Remotely Piloted Vehicle or Predator Drone. Similarly PGMs are also known as smart-bombs.  
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Precision Guided Munitions 
During the Vietnam War laser-guided weapons were used but would not be considered advanced 
when compared to modern PGMs. It was not until the Gulf War in 1991 that PGMs, also known as 
‘smart bombs’ came to public attention despite only 8% of the munitions used in the conflict being 
guided. The percentage of PGMs used has increased during subsequent conflicts to 29% in Kosovo, 
60% in Afghanistan and 68% in Iraq (Mahnken 2008: 223). A PGM does not have an engine to guide 
the bomb to its target as a missile does; rather it relies on height and gravity for propulsion. Wings or 
fins move in response to guidance commands, in effect gliding the bomb to its target but still relying 
on gravity. This means PGMs need to be dropped from an aircraft and therefore cannot be launched 
from the ground or a ship.  
 
Following their rapid development during the 1990’s, Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs) have 
become the weapon of choice for United States (U.S.) forces (Mahnken 2008: 200). JDAMs are  strap 
on guidance kits that utilise Global Positioning Systems (GPS) to enhance the delivery of 1,000 to 
2,000 pound bombs (Grasso 2002: 10). These kits have the ability to make a ‘dumb’ or free-falling 
bomb into a ‘smart’ or guided bomb and cost around US$20,000 (Vries 2003). This is a 
comparatively cheap weapon; the Tomahawk missile delivers a 1,000 pound warhead with roughly 
the same precision, but costs closer to US$600,000 (Vries 2003). The development of JDAMs has 
created a cheaper, more precise way for the U.S. Military to undertake warfare through air bombing 
campaigns. Such weaponry continues to be developed and it is argued that “the weapons of future will 
be more than smart – they will be ‘brilliant’” (M. Schmitt 1999: 164). Such developments are not 
without consequence, there have been many incidents where PGMs have killed civilians. However, as 
Maja Zehfuss (2010: 7) highlights “many of the spectacular ‘mistakes’ in recent wars have indeed not 
been due to weapon failure but – or so it was claimed – to intelligence failure.” The Royal Air Force 
(RAF) acknowledged that on 25
th
 March 2011 Afghan civilians were killed by an RAF Reaper during 
an airstrike that targeted Taliban fighters (Hopkins 2011b). Nevertheless, it was made clear that “the 
British forces remain convinced about the use of Reapers and insist the civilian deaths were due to 
intelligence failures on the ground rather than problems with the aircraft” (Hopkins 2011b). Similar 
incidents can occur with PGMs, for example, an air controller confused the GPS coordinates of his 
team and those of the target, accidentally ordering a 2,000 pound bomb onto his units position 
(Mahnken 2008: 201). Despite the continued development of increasing autonomous technology, 
human error is an ongoing problem.  
 
PGMs or ‘smart bombs’ are not the most recent or advanced technology to be used in Afghanistan. 
However, they are an important aspect of the strategies and tactics used during the war in Afghanistan 
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and have been used to a significant extent. The percentage of PGMs used in airstrikes is increasing; 
this is due to the low risk to U.S. soldiers, lower civilian casualty rates and highly visible success. 
These benefits have meant that air bombing campaigns have become more acceptable to both the 
general public and the military within the U.S. This is important as these groups are thought to have a 
lower tolerance for casualties, both military and civilian, than ever before (Allen 2007). By lessening 
the dangers to civilians PGMs have contributed to the popular acceptance of airstrikes and warfare, it 
can be argued that conflicts will become more frequent as the danger to civilian lives lessens. Noel 
Sharkey predicted that the development of UCAVs could “reduce the threshold for war... one of the 
great inhibitors of war is the body bag count, but that is undermined by the idea of riskless war” (Wan 
and Finn 2011).
2
 The development of PGMs contributes to the perception of increasingly riskless 
warfare as there is now a cost effective way to strike targets while still minimising civilian casualties. 
These benefits have seen PGMs consistently praised by both military and academic commentators, 
even being described as “the gifts that keep on giving” (Meilinger 2009: 202). 
 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles  
UAVs are defined by the Department of Defence as: 
 powered, aerial vehicles that do not carry a human operator, use aerodynamic forces to 
provide vehicle lift, can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely, can be expendable or 
recoverable, and can carry a lethal or nonlethal payload (Bone and Bolkcom 2003: 1).  
UAVs were first introduced during the First World War but were criticised as being unreliable and 
inaccurate (Valavanis 2007: ix). They were subsequently used in Vietnam but did not ‘come of age’ 
until the conflicts of the 1990s, such as Operation Desert Storm and the Bosnian War, which 
increased interest in UAV technology (Mahnken 2008: 220; Valavanis 2007: 3). Before 9/11 UAVs 
were controversial as no one department within law enforcement or the military wanted neither the 
burden of responsibility nor the cost of the UAV programme. After 9/11 the importance of 
information and surveillance was made clear to the public and government creating a renewed interest 
in controlling and developing UAVs. The need for UCAVs became apparent as on at least two 
occasions during 2000 as UAVs, being used for surveillance in Afghanistan, were thought to see Bin 
Laden but had no way to strike (Mahnken 2008: 201). Hank Crumpton, then a CIA operative in 
Afghanistan, described the situation as having “’too many political, legal and military constraints’, 
[so] the CIA couldn't simply pull the trigger” (Ghosh and Thompson 2009). The inability to act 
prompted increased calls to government officials to allow UAVs to have a combat capability and a 
programme was launched to create the first UCAV in 2000 (Mahnken 2008: 201). The first Hellfire 
missile was successfully fired from a Predator on 16 February 2001, over six months before 9/11 
                                                     
2 Further discussion of this issue can be found in Chapter 5 under the heading ‘Threshold for War’.  
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(Solomon and Bridis 2003). The ever increasing use of UCAVs in conflict situations, despite ethical 
concerns, does not seem to be in doubt. The Quadrennial Defense Review report released in 2006 
claimed that nearly half of the future long-range strike force will be unmanned (Mahnken 2008: 224). 
This prediction is compatible with claims made by other writers and officials. Donald Rumsfeld 
(2002: 28) argued that Afghanistan showed “how effective unmanned aircraft could be – but also 
revealed their weaknesses and how few we have of them.” Rumsfeld (2002: 28) suggested that there 
needed to be a shift in the balance of the U.S. arsenal towards unmanned capabilities and away from 
manned systems. It is clear that UCAVs will continue to have a significant role in future conflicts. 
 
There is increasing global interest in the development of UAV and UCAV technology. This is argued 
as an important trend strategically, the “U.S. military success with drones have changed strategic 
thinking worldwide and spurred a global rush for unmanned aircraft” (Wan and Finn 2011). More 
than 50 counties have purchased UAVs and many have begun development of UCAV technology 
(Wan and Finn 2011). As yet, UCAVs are not openly sold on the weapons market, with the exception 
of the U.S. selling to some close allies. Currently there is no country that could ‘match’ the U.S. 
UCAV capabilities. No other state possesses the weaponry, sensors or telecommunications systems 
that have provided the U.S with the ability to successfully deploy UCAVs worldwide (Wan and Finn 
2011). However, other countries, especially China, are developing these capabilities and they will 
only improve. At the Zhuhai Air Show in November 2010 more than two dozen Chinese UAV models 
were put on display, however, the capabilities of these models have yet to be proven (Wan and Finn 
2011).  
 
Since first deployed, UAV technology has been increasingly developed to improve reliability and 
accuracy. There are now dozens of UAV and UCAV models available. They come in a variety of 
sizes and have a range of flight and combat abilities. An important feature of UAVs is that they are 
cheaper than manned planes to produce and maintain. UAVs do not need the same level of failsafe 
equipment or life support for a pilot (Brzezinski 2003; Kaplan 2006). The difference in cost is 
significant as it costs US$4.2 million to build an F-22 plane, while for the same amount over 40 
UAVs could have be produced (Kaplan 2006). These savings are important to a government and a 
military who are currently engaged in expensive wars, recovering from a recession and trying to 
reduce the country’s deficit. In 2011 the Air Force is proposing to acquire more unmanned than 
combat aircraft for the first time (Barnes 2010). The Department of Defense (DoD) has been 
described as the “Champion” of UAVs in regards to funding initiatives, research and development as 
well as procurement (Valavanis 2007: ix). Spending on Reapers and Predators grew from US$877.5 
million in 2010 to US$1.4 billion in 2011, an increase of approximately 60% (Barnes 2010). In 
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comparison  the overall DoD budget only grew by 7.1% to US$708 billion in 2011 (Barnes 2010). 
This increase in spending highlights the Pentagon’s focus on developing and producing unmanned 
aircrafts (Barnes 2010). These budget increases are important as UAV technology is advancing 
swiftly, therefore, the government needs to allow money for research to ensure the potential seen in 
UAV technology is fulfilled.  
 
The DoD possess a variety of models of UAV and UCAV, including the Predator, Global Hawk, 
Reaper, Pioneer, Hunter, Shadow, Desert Hawk and Raven (Bone and Bolkcom 2003; Chivers et al. 
2010). These models range from the size of an airliner to an insect (Bone and Bolkcom 2003). They 
have varying capabilities in respect to flight altitude and duration as well as munitions and armament. 
UAVs and UCAVs are used by all branches of the U.S. military, including the Army, Navy and Air 
Force, for a variety of tasks dependant on the needs of the force. Defense Secretary Robert Gates 
stated that “the more we have used [UAVs and UCAVs], the more we have identified their potential 
in a broader and broader set of circumstances” (Barnes 2010). The RQ-1 Predator is the most well 
known of the UAV models that the military operates and is currently in use in Afghanistan (Kaplan 
2006). UAVs are often called “Predator Drones” by the media and public regardless of the model. The 
first Predator was delivered to the military in 1994 and first used in a combat situation during the 
intervention in Bosnia, logging over 150 hours of surveillance (Ghosh and Thompson 2009). During 
the conflict the Predator provided electro-optical, infrared, and synthetic aperture radar imagery 
(Mahnken 2008: 182). RQ-1 Predators were also the model chosen to be transformed into UCAVs by 
attaching two Hellfire air-to-surface missiles (Mahnken 2008: 201). The Predator is 27 foot in length, 
has a 50 foot wingspan, weighs only 1,130 pounds without fuel or bombs and can stay aloft for 24 
hours on its 4 cylinder engine (Kaplan 2006). The Predator did not ‘draw blood’ for the first time until 
the 5
th
 November 2002 (Ghosh and Thompson 2009). It was used to destroy an SUV in Yemen 
believed to be containing high ranking Al Qaeda leader, Ali Qaed Sinan al-Harithi, the attack killed 
six men (Ghosh and Thompson 2009)., Developing a variety of models allows the DoD to implement 
the model with the ability and design that best suits the needs of the operation. 
 
The majority of U.S. UAVs and UCAVs currently deployed in Afghanistan are not controlled from 
within the country but rather by operators located at Nellis Air Force Base located outside Las Vegas 
(Kaplan 2006; Mahnken 2008: 224). An RAF squadron is based at the Creech Air Force Base, also 
located in Nevada, from which they to operate RAF UAVs and UCAVs in Afghanistan. The RAF 
squadron is based in the U.S. as it is recognised that the U.S. has ‘taken the lead’ in this weapons 
technology (Hopkins 2011a). Underground and underwater fibre-optic cables link the control stations 
in Nevada to Europe, where a satellite dish makes the connection directly to any predator in the 
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Middle East (Kaplan 2006). Local airfields launch the aircraft before operators in the U.S. take over 
(Kaplan 2006). Operators undertake training under the new ‘Basic Sensor Operator Course’ to operate 
unmanned aircraft (Tan 2010). The graduating class of February 12, 2010, contained airmen straight 
from basic training who may have never flown in or piloted an aircraft. Before this classes were 
undertaken by prior-service airmen who wanted to change careers (Tan 2010). These changes in 
careers can be motivated by a number of factors including job security. One airman described the 
reasoning behind his change in career as “looking for a job that was less support and more on the front 
lines” (Tan 2010). This is a quickly expanding field and the need for operators is clear as there are 
600% more missions undertaken currently than five years ago (Tan 2010). These missions can take 
place domestically or internationally without operators having to leave the security or safety of home. 
Despite this increase in operator training a recent focus of development has been to make UAVs more 
autonomous, meaning that UAVs would increasingly respond to pre-programmed, computer 
instructions rather than being controlled remotely by a pilot (Mahnken 2008: 223).  
 
The War in Afghanistan 
The war in Afghanistan, which has now spilled over into Pakistan, is a suitable case study both PGMs 
and UAVs have been used within this conflict. The length of the conflict also allowed for a significant 
amount of discussion and debate to occur, creating sufficient sources and viewpoints for analysis. 
Furthermore, there has been considerable debate and controversy over the use of UCAVs to cross the 
Afghanistan border and carry out operations in Pakistan.. The U.S. is one of the primary actors in the 
war in Afghanistan and maintains the most technologically advanced military in the world, spending 
billions of dollars each year on continued weapons research and development. This allows them to 
implement new technologies on a scale that could not be achieved by any other military force in the 
world.  
 
The war in Afghanistan utilises a counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy that has comprehensively 
incorporated advancing weapons technology. This has been acknowledged in the 2006 COIN Field 
Manual which states that “today’s high-technology air and space systems have proven their worth in 
COIN operations. Unmanned aircraft systems, such as the Predator, give counterinsurgents 
unprecedented capabilities in surveillance and target acquisition” (Departments of the Army and Navy 
2006: E-3). The use of advanced weaponry by the U.S. military is not limited to the latest conflict; 
rather it is arguably a historical trend. Thomas Mahnken (2008: 5) argues that “[r]eliance on advanced 
technology has been a central pillar of the American way of war. No other nation in recent history has 
placed greater emphasis upon the role of technology in planning and waging war than the U.S.”. John 
Pike also see the advancement of military technology as an important part of American culture, going 
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as far as to say that “American ingenuity has been devoted to devising ever more efficient ways of 
killing the enemy and preventing the enemy from killing us” (Pike 2009). The desire to have the most 
advanced technology is important as it continues today and has driven the development of the 
technologies that are used within the war in Afghanistan. 
 
Perspectives – Strategic, Legal and Ethical 
By developing an understanding of how the technologies are being discussed from different 
perspectives, some of the implications of their use and development can be grasped, as well as 
identifying where there is a lack of understanding or focus that may need to be addressed. The three 
categories – strategic, legal and ethical - were decided upon after initial research indicated that the 
majority of available literature fell into these areas.  
 
Strategic Perspectives 
Several aspects of military strategy have been impacted by advancing weapons technology. This 
includes debate as to what effect these weapons are having on the face of warfare and how these 
changes will impact on future conflicts. The strengths and weaknesses of technologies are discussed 
as well as what strategies are suitable as modern warfare evolves. Future directions of weapons 
research are also considered. The strategic perspective takes into account the opinions of military 
personal, strategic planners and other military focused writers. Key works were considered including 
Colin Gray’s (2005) Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare. This book discusses the strategic 
future of warfare and argues that warfare will not change greatly in the next century, while it will 
contain new technology and take place in new contexts, it will remain organized violence in the 
pursuit of political goals. Mahnken’s (2008) book Technology and the American Way of War since 
1945 offers a detailed understanding of the use of technology by the U.S. military throughout its 
history, including the development and deployment of UCAV and PGM weaponry systems. Matthew 
Brzezinski’s (2003) article The Unmanned Army, published in the in the New York Times, discusses 
the use of robots in the battlefield to save U.S. soldiers lives. Brzezinski outlines the advantages and 
disadvantages of the U.S. military using machines to fight rather than soldiers. The issues raised 
within this article are fundamental factors within the strategic perspective, as the protection of 
soldiers’ lives continues to be a priority for the U.S military. Furthermore, Michael Schmitt’s (2008) 
Asymmetrical Warfare and International Humanitarian Law defines different forms of asymmetrical 
warfare as well as discussing the effects of asymmetrical warfare on the law governing methods and 
means of warfare. These books and articles are fundamtental to this research as they provide a 
selection of persepctives as to what effect weapons development has had and will have on warfare and 
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the strategies utilitsed during combat. This overview of key literature demonstrates that there is a 
large variety of discussion regarding the strategic capabilities of new weaponry, some of which 
broach the subjects of ethical or legal concerns. However, as this research will show, the legal and 
ethical issues surrounding new weapons technology exceed those raised within the strategic literature.  
  
 
Legal Perspectives 
Throughout human history there has been conflict. These conflicts and the resulting violence have 
become more organised over time leading to attempts to create normative architectures that could 
constrain and limit it (M. Schmitt 1998: 1051). Guidelines for modern warfare can be found within 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL), based primarily on the Geneva Conventions and its 
fundamental principles of proportionality, discrimination and military necessity. There are several 
challenges presented by advancing weapons technology, including the use of overwhelming force and 
the difficulty of defining the enemy. With the development of new weapons technology presenting 
such legal challenges there is increasing debate as to whether or not the existing IHL framework can 
cope with such significant change. In order to address this question the adaptability of law, the utility 
of normative restraint and legitimacy, as well as the use of law by powerful states, will be discussed. 
Law can be utilised either in reaction or pre-emptively to changes in warfare and has evolved to adapt 
to changes in warfare.  
 
This perspective incorporates the opinions of both international lawyers and governments to establish 
the legality of development and deployment of new weapons technology. Key voices and literature 
were reviewed while considering these debates. Harold Koh (2010), a legal advisor to the US state 
department, presented a speech to the American Society of International Law entitled The Obama 
Administration and International Law. Through this speech Koh clearly outlined the Obama 
Administrations viewpoint on several topics including the legality of using of UCAV technology and 
precision targeting. This is an important perspective as it provides the U.S. government’s response to 
legal criticisms of UCAV deployment. Thomas Smith’s (2002) The New Laws of War: Legitimizing 
Hi-Tech and Infrastructural Violence provides a clear and detailed understanding of the legal 
objections that have been raised since the deployment of new weapons technology. Smith also 
discusses how humanitarian laws of war have been affected in light of a new generation of hi-tech 
weaponry and strategic theory. Drone Warfare and the Law of Armed Conflict by Ryan Vogel (2010) 
discusses the use of UCAVs or ‘drones’ in regards to the jus in bello principles of proportionality, 
military necessity, distinction and humanity. Vogel concludes his work by proposing legal and policy 
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guidelines for the lawful use of drones in armed conflict. During his career Michael Schmitt has 
published extensively on the issues of international law, warfare and weaponry, key works include: 
Bellum Americanum: The U.S. view of Twenty-First Century War and its possible implications for the 
Law of Armed Conflict (1998), U.S. Security Strategies: A Legal Assessment (2003-04), Targeting and 
International Humanitarian Law in Afghanistan (2009) as well as 21st Century Conflict: Can the Law 
Survive? (2007). This selection of legal literature shows that there is a number of recent works that 
focus specifically on the legal issues raised by the deployment of advancing weapons technologies.  
 
Ethical Perspectives 
The introduction of advancing weapons technology has caused new debates over the ethics of war, 
resulting in a growing amount of literature that discusses the ethical implications of advancing 
weaponry. Zehfuss’ (2010: 1) article Targeting: Precision and the Production of Ethics argues that 
“praise for precision not only produces Western warfare as ethical but also both relies upon and 
reproduces a particular kind of ethics, based upon the notion of non-combatant protection.” This 
means that advancing weapons technology significantly influences the perception of ethical actions 
within warfare. Steinar Sanderød’s (2009) The use of Air Power Today: Have New Ethical Challenges 
Occurred? discusses ethical concerns that have been raised as air capabilities have improved and 
asymmetrical warfare increases. Ethical issues that are discussed include: the effect on the threshold 
for war; the difficulty of discrimination; and the effect of creating distance from the battlefield. 
Military Frameworks: Technological know-how and the Legitimization of Warfare by John Kaag and 
Whitley Kaufman (2009: 585) argues that “the development of [PGMs], stand-off weaponry and 
military robots may force policymakers and strategists to experience new ethical tensions” rather than 
alleviating the ethical dilemmas that arise from the ‘fog of war’. This means that while precision 
warfare and weaponry may have been advocated as ethical, due to an increasing ability to protect 
civilian lives, there are many new ethical concerns that are being raised and need to be addressed. 
This selection of ethical literature demonstrates the continued emergence of moral dilemmas that have 
arisen from the development of advanced weapons technologies. These works also reveal the variety 
of the debates that are taking place within the ethical perspective.  
 
The ability to take lives without being in a conflict zone is a relatively recent development within 
warfare; it is only within the last century that such capabilities have become available. These 
developments in weapons technology have created ethical debates surrounding humanitarian warfare. 
While historical questions continue to be asked, for example does a moral end justify immoral means? 
New questions have also been raised; such as, is it ethical to take a life when not in danger, or will it 
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tarnish the humanitarian motives of a state if they are willing to participate in conflict but not to put 
soldiers in harm’s way? Precision warfare has been seen as the future of conflict but this may have 
huge ethical implications if the technology is not as precise as has been claimed. The loss of civilian 
lives has always been a part of war, however, the use of precision weaponry means that these deaths 
are now deemed ‘accidents’; such a definition arguably does not allow for blame or criticism on those 
who wield the technology (Owens 2003: 596). The development of weapons technology is becoming 
more rapid and weapons, such as UCAVs, are being designed to act more autonomously. This is to 
combat human error which is often the cause of accidents or mistakes. However, this raises several 
ethical issues as the choice of whether or not to take life has previously been a human judgement. 
Further debate considers the morality of continuing weapons research. It can be argued that all 
weapons research is immoral as weapons are capable of only harm and destruction and should 
therefore be stopped. On the other hand, if weaponry is created that could potentially lessen civilian 
casualties or save lives then it could be argued that researchers have a moral obligation to develop 
such weaponry. Moral judgements are often based upon cultural backgrounds and personal 
experience, making these debates nearly impossible to resolve as currently no universal moral code 
exists. It is up to the individual to decide which aspects of these debates hold merit and what military 
actions are ethically acceptable.  
 
By examining the use of UCAVs, UAVs and PGMs within the war in Afghanistan this thesis will 
analyse the similarities and differences between the debates occurring within the fields of strategy, 
law and ethics. Weapons technology is having a significant impact on how war is waged and can be a 
divisive subject. However, as this research will show, advancing weapons technologies have the 
ability to create an environment that encourages strategy to incorporate and learn from legal and 
ethical debates rather than overlook them. This ability is demonstrated through the emergence of 
COIN warfare as well as the renaissance of the discrimination norm.  
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Chapter 2: New Weapons Technology and 
the War in Afghanistan 
  
In the early hours of Friday 13
th
 January 2006, in the Pakistani village of Damadola, the U.S. military 
carried out a mission using UCAVs to destroy an enemy target using 10 Hellfire Missiles. Top 
ranking Al Qaeda member Ayman al-Zawahiri
3
 was believed to be having dinner at this location. 
Despite the information being based on “good reporting” it proved to be false (Lamb 2006). What 
resulted from the attack were the deaths of four or five Al Qaeda members as well as 18 Pakistani 
villagers, including at least eight women and five children who were “martyred” and “torn into pieces 
by the deadly missiles” (Pakistan Observer 2006). It could be argued that if the U.S. had reacted with 
a ground force rather than an aerial attack the lives of these civilians and the grief caused to their 
loved ones may have been spared. "I ran out and saw planes", said Shah Zaman, who lost two sons 
and a daughter in the attack, "I ran towards a nearby mountain with my wife. When we were running 
we heard three more explosions and I saw my home being hit" (Lamb 2006). Sahibzada Haroon 
Rashid, a member of parliament who lives nearby said "the houses have been razed. There is nothing 
left. Pieces of the missiles are scattered all around. Everything has been blackened in a 100-yard 
radius” (Lamb 2006). Despite the civilian deaths and the destruction of a significant area of the 
village, U.S. officials defended the strike as “the right course of action based on timely intelligence 
about Zawahiri's whereabouts” (Lamb 2006). An editorial in the Pakistan Observer described the 
attack as “the latest gory incident” and “nothing but sheer terrorism” (Pakistan Observer 2006). There 
were several articles describing this event in international publications (Lamb 2006; Morgan and 
Cameron-Moore 2006; Pakistan Observer 2006; The Boston Globe 2006). Other civilian deaths and 
the destruction of property in both Afghanistan and Pakistan have not been so widely publicised. This 
tragic event and the many other similar ‘mistakes’ or targeted attacks that have caused civilian 
casualties, show the importance of having discussions about these technologies due to the intentional 
or accidental consequences that have resulted.  
 
The context of the war in Afghanistan will be outlined within this chapter and the use of UCAVs and 
PGMs within this conflict will be discussed. This chapter will provide an understanding of what 
technologies are being used in Afghanistan, what effect they are having on the conflict as well as how 
public attitudes towards these weapons have developed in recent years. The public perspective is 
outlined within this chapter as the perspectives discussed in the following chapters are often from 
                                                     
3 Since Bin Laden’s death in May 2011 Zawahiri has been named as the new leader of Al Qaeda.  
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expert opinions such as lawyers, political scientists, politicians and military strategists. Since the 
visual and public nature of the Gulf War the perception has emerged that the U.S. military is 
increasingly in control of the devastation that occurs during warfare. However, this may be a distorted 
or exaggerated perception (Zehfuss 2010: 3). Before the technology of warfare continues to advance it 
is vital that the actions of current technology are reviewed in detail. This will provide a better 
understanding of what it will mean to continue or increase the use of existing weapons technologies, 
as well as highlighting the consequences of continued research and further advancement. 
 
The War in Afghanistan 
The war in Afghanistan has included the use of UAVs and UCAVs for surveillance and intelligence 
since the war was officially declared in October 2001 (U.S. Army 2010: i). However, it is unclear 
when UCAVs were first used in lethal operations. The U.S. participates in the conflict as a member of 
the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO). In 2001 the objective of the war was to remove the Taliban from power and bring about a 
transition to stable and democratic leadership in Afghanistan. In order to achieve this objective the 
Afghan Model was developed. This term describes the strategy implemented in Afghanistan which 
consisted of a comprehensive bombing campaign using both ‘dumb’ and ‘smart’ bombs, followed by 
a relatively small ground force consisting of elite U.S. soldiers and utilising the presence of an 
indigenous military force. This was originally regarded as very successful strategy as the Taliban fell 
from power in a matter of months and an interim government took control of the state. However, the 
Taliban regrouped and continued to fight, becoming insurgents within Afghanistan. The U.S. 
responded to this change by adapting a COIN strategy to effectively combat the insurgency. The 
current mission, ISAF states, is: 
In support of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ISAF conducts 
operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability and will of the insurgency, support the 
growth in capacity and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and 
facilitate improvements in governance and socio-economic development in order to 
provide a secure environment for sustainable stability that is observable to the population 
(International Security Assistance Force 2010). 
Combating the insurgency is still a priority of the ISAF but there is also emphasis on reconstruction 
and creating stability. This is important as the goal has always been for the Afghan government and 
military to eventually be given back control from the ISAF. 
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In 2006 Lieutenant General David Petraeus and Lieutenant General James Amos oversaw the 
development of a new COIN field Manual, the fundamental ideas of which are still controversial 
(Fick and Nagl 2009: 43). These include focusing on protecting civilians over killing the enemy, 
assuming greater risk and using minimum not maximum force (Fick and Nagl 2009: 43). These key 
ideas will be discussed throughout this thesis. The U.S. military acknowledged that civilian casualties 
caused by PGMs and airstrikes within Afghanistan were causing anti-American sentiment within the 
population. In order to address this, strict new rules of engagement were developed and introduced in 
2009, minimizing the use of airstrikes (Chivers et al. 2010). Despite these regulation there is still 
growing frustration. In May 2011 President Hamid Karzai stated that he was giving his ‘last warning’ 
to NATO forces as Afghan civilian casualties could no longer be tolerated (Sommerville 2011). 
Karzai claims he has repeatedly asked NATO not to undertake anymore unnecessary operations and 
to minimise the use of night raids and airstrikes (Moore 2011).  
 
The increasing number of accidental civilian deaths has led to growing outrage at foreign forces. The 
New America Foundation think-tank estimates that “one in four of those killed by US drones since 
2004 was an innocent civilian. The Brookings Institute says the ratio is higher” (Hopkins 2011a). 
Some examples of ‘botched’ NATO air raids include: the deaths of 27 civilians killed during a strike 
on a convoy of vehicles in February 2010; up to 142 were killed when fuel tankers were hit after 
being hijacked by Taliban soldiers in September 2009; and in August 2008 up to 90 people, including 
60 children, were killed (Asian News International 2010). It is unclear which of these air strikes were 
carried out by manned aircraft or utilised advancing weapons technology such as PGMS or UCAVs. 
In December 2009 President Barak Obama stated that the U.S. would “begin the transfer of our forces 
out of Afghanistan in July of 2011” (Montopoli 2010). However, as this date approaches it is now 
claimed that the end of the war will be closer to 2014, but this date is also flexible and can be adjusted 
if necessary (Montopoli 2010).  
 
Beyond the War in Afghanistan 
Since 2004, the use of UCAVs has spread beyond Afghanistan as the CIA has carried out a campaign 
against specific terrorist targets in Pakistan. Since 2009 the term ‘AfPak’ has been used to describe 
operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is argued that this demonstrates the desire of the Obama 
Administration to take a “unified approach to policy and strategy for these two countries” (Prados 
2009). The objectives of the campaign in Pakistan are to remove Al Qaeda’s top leaders and to deny 
sanctuary within the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) to Taliban and other fighters who 
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cross the border into Afghanistan and engage U.S. soldiers in combat (Ghosh and Thompson 2009). 
Operations within Pakistan are controlled by the CIA and are undertaken by the U.S. unilaterally. This 
is emphasised by the distancing of the United Kingdom (U.K.) air force, with RAF Wing Commander 
Chris Thirtle stating that the “UK Reaper only ever has, and only ever will, operate in Afghanistan. 
The border is absolutely sacrosanct, end of story” (Hopkins 2011a). 
 
Despite the successful assassinations of some Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders, UCAV attacks have 
created tension. There has been some confusion as to whether or not the Pakistani Government was 
aware of and approved the attacks. Former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf allowed drones to 
operate within Pakistan, but ensured there were limitations on when and where they could strike 
(Ghosh and Thompson 2009). After President Musharraf resigned in August 2008 a new “bargain” 
was stuck giving the U.S. much more freedom (Ghosh and Thompson 2009). The new government, 
led by President Asif Ali Zardari and Chief of Staff General Ashfaq Kayani, enabled more drone 
operations while publically criticizing the U.S. for continuing the attacks (Ghosh and Thompson 
2009). In 2004 there was only one reported UCAV attack within Pakistan (Roggio and Mayer 2010). 
By 2007 this number had increased to 5 attacks. In 2008 there was a significant increase to 35 and 53 
in 2009. In 2010 this number more than doubled, peaking at 117 attacks. By May 2011, 26 attacks had 
been recorded (Roggio and Mayer 2010). The increase in UCAV operations shows a high level of 
commitment to the technology and strategy by the Obama Administration which came to power in 
2008. The UCAV operations have been criticised as weakening the fragile government of President 
Asif Ali Zardari and raising anti-American sentiment within Pakistan (Ghosh and Thompson 2009). 
This has led to many asking if the risk of anti-American sentiment is worth the gains. David Kilcullen, 
a counterterrorism expert, points out that “if we wind up killing a whole bunch of Al Qaeda leaders 
and, at the same time, Pakistan implodes, that’s not a victory for us” (Ghosh and Thompson 2009). 
Pakistan officials have spoken out against the campaign, some going as far as to claim that the 
majority of strikes have either missed their objectives or killed civilians (Ghosh and Thompson 2009). 
As well as the ethical and legal debates surrounding the use of UCAVs, there are further issues that 
are raised when attacks cross borders. If the Pakistan Government did not give approval for the 
attacks then the actions of the U.S. can be seen as breaching Pakistan’s sovereign rights, this would be 
a violation of international law by the U.S.  
 
How and when these technologies should be implemented is debated by the public and media in 
regards to overseas conflicts. Currently, however, the discussion also includes the implications of 
domestic use within the U.S. The number of UAVs owned by the military has increased significantly 
and new uses for the technology have been suggested. The use of UAVs domestically has been 
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welcomed by some while others are more cautious. UAVs are currently being used in Arizona and 
Texas to patrol the border between the U.S. and Mexico. The Department of Homeland Security use 
these UAVs to monitor the border in an effort to intercept the illegal traffic of people and drugs 
(McFeatters 2010). Both houses of Congress have passed legislation allowing UAVs to fly 
domestically. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has been drafting a plan to grant flying 
rights to UAVs since 2006 (McFeatters 2010). However, there are a number of concerns to consider, 
the majority of which are related to safety. The amount of air traffic in the U.S. could cause problems 
and lead to a collision, this is not such an important factor in Iraq and Afghanistan as there is less air 
traffic. There are also concerns over the consequences if there were to be a loss of communication 
with the UAV, especially over populated areas. However, the most important issue for some U.S. 
citizens is a loss of privacy. Dave Bohon (2010) argues that the privacy of law abiding citizens may 
be in jeopardy: 
While one might applaud the use of drones to protect America’s borders and even to stop 
sundry criminal activities, the idea that there are potentially “many more uses” for the 
unmanned airplanes has the stamp of government intrusion all over it. 
On the other hand, there are those that are pushing for the further implementation on UAVs in the 
U.S. The technology could be used in a variety of fields, such as, weather research, search and rescue, 
patrolling highways, hunting fugitives and monitoring pipelines (McFeatters 2010). Hank Krakowski, 
FAA’s head of air-traffic operations, stated that “I think industry and some of the operators are 
frustrated that we’re not moving fast enough, but safety is first” (Bohon 2010). The use of UAVs by 
the Department of Homeland Security shows that while it is still controversial, the benefits of using 
UAVs domestically may soon outweigh the risks. A 21
st
 Century Military for America states that: 
 We need greater investment in advanced technology ranging from the revolutionary, like 
unmanned aerial vehicles and electronic warfare capabilities, to systems like the C-17 
cargo and KC-X air refuelling aircraft—which may not be glamorous to politicians, but 
are the backbone of our future ability to extend global power (Obama for America 2008). 
 These sentiments were reiterated by Secretary Gates who foresaw that “we will continue to see 
significant growth for some years into the future even as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan eventually 
wind down” (Barnes 2010). Such comments show the level of support within the Obama 
Administration for continued utilisation of UAV and UCAV technology.  
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General Perceptions of New Weapons Technology 
How warfare is conducted is not based solely on what technology is available. Rather, as C. Gray 
(2005b: 120) highlights, “there is a trialogue among what technology permits, what politics requires, 
and what society allows.” How society reacts to the implementation of an advanced weapon will 
determine where and when these technologies will be utilised by a state. Throughout the war in 
Afghanistan there have been events and developments that have changed how specific technologies 
are viewed. These technologies have been and are currently being discussed within many fields, 
including the public domain through media exposure. When the media prioritise an issue it can have a 
significant effect on public debate. This is especially important as the public are often no longer 
engaged in active warfare if the conflict is on foreign soil. It is now argued that the U.S. public in 
particular view and comprehend warfare as a spectator would a sport (C. S. Gray 2005b: 62). This is 
due to the disconnection from any active participation in warfare and engaging only through the 
global visual media. This creates a context where warfare can be viewed as a source of “vicarious 
excitement and even pleasure” (C. S. Gray 2005b: 62). 
 
How the media reports the use of technology changes over time as new events take place. Since 
advanced weapons technologies were first used in the war in Afghanistan there have been several key 
events that have been heavily reported by the global media. In June 2003 the U.S. media highlighted 
the early availability of UCAVs in 2001, resulting in several articles criticising the government for not 
heeding early warnings and deploying UCAVs into Afghanistan to kill Bin Laden (Solomon and 
Bridis 2003). This possibility was discussed, according to media sources, as little as a week before 
9/11 (Solomon and Bridis 2003). However, the deployment and use of UCAVs in Afghanistan before 
9/11 would have been illegal and highly provocative even though the technology was available. This 
shows support in the media for the technology when first implemented, if such pre-emptive measures 
avoid tragedies such as 9/11, despite the illegality of such action. Since 2003 there has been a 
significant amount of criticism of UCAVs due to the destruction they cause and the legal and ethical 
dilemmas they create.  
 
Another important event that influenced public perceptions of UCAV technology was the hacking of a 
U.S. military video feed from a UAV. This isolated incident was widely covered around the 17
th
 and 
18
th
 of December 2009. The breach was criticised as a major failure in security for the U.S. military. 
Meanwhile, the “largest Predator attack ever” occurred in Waziristan on the same day, 17th December 
2009 (B. Williams 2009). However, this event was not covered with the same level of attention. Only 
one reference to the attack was found on the NBC nightly news and was mentioned as part of the 
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overseas headlines, leaving the number of deaths or outcome of the attack unknown (B. Williams 
2009). As Jon Williams (2009) speculates in a letter to the editor of the Los Angeles Times in 2009:  
The Times reports, in sterile, coldblooded terms, that our military has carried out 48 
attacks by unmanned Predator and Reaper aircraft this year alone. Yet 10 is the number 
of supposedly high-level Taliban leaders you estimate we’ve killed. Were the remaining 
targets empty buildings? Or have we already taken hundreds, perhaps thousands, of lives 
through our cowardly actions?  
These are important questions as they address the global media’s lack of focus on the outcome of the 
attacks, the destruction and death caused, focusing instead on the deaths of Taliban or Al Qaeda 
terrorists. Similarly, reporter Lloyd De Vries (2003) states that even the accidental bombings of 
innocent Afghanis have received few reports in the media. It is hard to find accurate accounts of what 
civilian casualties and destruction is occurring in Afghanistan in Western media as a result of each 
attack. While there is some information on the effects in Pakistan due to the controversial nature of 
U.S. military action taking place, there is no such interest in what is happening to the Afghani people. 
Only large scale “mistakes” are reported in any depth, such as the 2002 bombing of a wedding party 
in village in the Uruzgan province. This bombing killed at least 30 civilians, although once again 
other reports conflict putting the death toll much higher (BBC News 2002).  
 
There are several writers who have consistently reported UCAV killings and argued against the use of 
the technology for lethal operations. The Statesman published the article entitled The ongoing 
American Predator attacks are illegal and immoral by Ali Ezzatyar and Shahpur Kabraji on the 13
th
 
April 2010. In this article Ezzatyer and Kabraji highlight the illegality of breaching the sovereignty of 
Pakistan as well as the human rights of the victims. They describe the use of the technology as 
“[i]llegal, immoral and strategically flawed” (Ezzatyar and Kabraji 2010). Furthermore, they 
emphasize that the attacks are “assassinations”, a term the U.S. has avoided preferring to describe and 
frame the attacks as part of an armed conflict, despite the fact that many of the victims are removed 
from any war zone. This article is one example of the argument against the use of technology in 
Afghanistan; however, such articles have been scarce. Occasionally there are articles that give 
accounts of the effects of U.S. air strikes such as Forgotten Victims, published by the Guardian in 
2002. It tells the story of a family forced to flee their home due to the U.S. bombings of their village. 
Two year old Asaq Mohammed and his six month old brother Abdul died of exposure after leaving 
their home (Steele 2002). The author Jonathan Steele asks “who killed Asaq Mohammed?” While the 
bombs did not directly kill him they did force his family to leave the shelter of their home. Steele also 
states that “the full cost of U.S. airstrikes will never be known, but many more died than those killed 
directly by bombs” (Steele 2002).  
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In July 2010, a group known as WikiLeaks released to the public classified documents belonging to 
the U.S. military. These documents provide insight into what has been occurring in Afghanistan at a 
level never before accessible by the media. Reporters and experts state that the documents “illustrate 
in mosaic detail why, after the U.S. has spent almost $300 billion on the war in Afghanistan, the 
Taliban are stronger than any time since 2001” (Chivers et al. 2010). Several insights into the 
documents have been claimed, the most significant being that while the U.S. military has not directly 
lied to the media there have been several misleading statements allowing the public to think the war 
was progressing more so than it really was (Chivers et al. 2010). These claims, while severe, are not 
verified. Many of these documents may be discredited in time; however, their release will continue to 
affect not only the relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan but also the continuing military strategy 
within Afghanistan.  
 
A further insight, identified during initial readings of the documents, refers specifically to the 
perceptions and use of UAVs and UCAVs. Chivers et al. (2010) claim that while the military employ 
more and more UAV technology “their performance is less impressive than officially portrayed.” This 
is due to several collisions or crashes that have caused U.S. troops to take risks to recover the 
technology. Despite the claim that UAVs are expendable, the U.S. military still try to keep the 
technology out of enemy hands. Several of the documents refer to the use of drones, describing 
mundane missions or incidents where mistakes were made. One such incident occurred on the 12
th
 
September 2009 when communication with a Reaper Drone was lost. Smaller UAVs such as the 
Raven or Desert Hawk are close to the size of a model plane and are often lost. The loss of a Reaper, 
however, had not occurred before (Chivers et al. 2010). Commanders were forced to have a manned 
plane shoot a missile at the $13 million piece of equipment before it flew into neighbouring 
Tajikistan. The satellite link was restored but the engine had been destroyed by the missile and 
controllers flew the Reaper into a mountain. These kinds of incidents may not be as rare as 
government and military leaders have caused the public to believe.  
 
The way in which advanced technology is framed by the global media differs depending on which 
technology is being discussed. The use of UCAVs in particular has been portrayed both positively and 
negatively by the media at various times. One way to view the development of UCAVs is as a 
milestone of technology. Brzezinski (2003) quotes an officer who stated that “in the annals of 
aviation, these were milestones, not unlike Sputnik or Lindbergh.” Those that share this viewpoint 
perceive the development of technology as inevitable and believe this cutting edge technology will 
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help America to move forward and improve lives. A contributor to The Wall Street Journal went as 
far as to claim that “drones have made war-fighting more humane” (The Wall Street Journal 2009). 
However, not all media has been positive. Many of the criticisms of these attacks point out the moral 
or legal objections to the technology and the way in which the military is implementing it. On the 
other hand, PGMs have received relatively little negative publicity. While the use of air bombing 
campaigns as a strategy has been criticised, these munitions are perceived as saving lives as carpet 
bombing an area is no longer necessary and to do so would be immoral or barbaric when PGMs are 
available. The perception that PGMs limit civilian casualties, whether this is accurate or not, creates 
an environment where air bombing campaigns are more acceptable to the public. The only negative 
publicity identified criticised the lack of information available about the number of civilians who are 
killed during such operations. Although precision weapons appear to be killing fewer civilians there is 
no real way to know (Vries 2003). There is no official count of the civilian casualties that have 
occurred during the war in Afghanistan and neither side of the conflict can agree on the number of 
civilian casualties (Zehfuss 2010: 11). Al Qaeda and the Taliban have been accused of exaggerating 
numbers; the U.S. in turn has been accused of covering up how many civilian casualties their bombs 
have caused. Media reports on the war in Afghanistan often refer to civilian deaths as resulting from 
‘airstrikes’. This is problematic as it is unclear if these attacks were carried out by a manned or 
unmanned aircraft or whether ‘smart’ or ‘dumb’ munitions were used. Another trend when looking at 
PGMs in the media is the focus on the Iraq War. While PGMs are used extensively in both the Iraq 
and Afghanistan Wars the majority of media coverage has focused on Iraq. This is true in relation to 
all media coverage of the two conflicts, not just in the coverage of PGMs. The war in Afghanistan has 
often been referred to as “America’s other war” and has had to compete for resources and attention 
with the Iraq war which, due to its controversial nature, has gained much more government and public 
awareness (Bowman and Dale 2009). 
 
The entertainment industry is also a source of information for a large percentage of the western 
population. This is a potential resource for the public, who could view and learn about technologies 
that would otherwise be outside the realm of their experience. This is true for many aspects of life, 
especially if there is an aspect of sensationalism as there often is with weapons technology. As James 
Der Derian (2001: 166) argues that “the military and the movie industry have been in a technical relay 
race for seeing and killing the enemy while securing and seducing the citizen.” A recent example is 
the movie Transformers (Bay 2007). This is a high-grossing, blockbuster movie viewed by millions. It 
features a UAV being used for surveillance of a battle field. A UAV arrives quickly to assess the 
situation, however, it is important to note that the U.S. military assesses the situation using the UAV 
but send in a manned aircraft to drop PGMs using laser targeting which helps the ‘good guys’ of the 
20 
 
movie. The role of a UAV was also portrayed in the movie Body of Lies (Scott 2008). This is a spy 
movie based in the Middle East during the War on Terror. At one point a CIA operative has a meeting 
in the desert and is picked up by a convoy of trucks. His colleagues in the U.S. watch the situation by 
way of a UAV, however, they cannot tell what truck he is in when they separate due to a cloud of dust 
and he is captured. In this case UAV technology is portrayed as inadequate. At other times in the 
movie, however, the real time capabilities and the technology used by the U.S. are shown as powerful 
and accurate. These portrayals of military technology, whether in the media or movies, have the 
potential to have a significant impact on how the public perceive the use of these military 
technologies in real conflicts, such as Afghanistan.  
 
Conclusion 
The implications of using UCAVs and PGMs have been discussed and will be further considered as 
they are causing death and destruction on a large scale. While UCAV and PGM technology can seem 
futuristic, they have in fact been used by the U.S. military in Afghanistan since 2001. Over the last 
decade this technology has been responsible for thousands of deaths and an immeasurable amount of 
damage to public and private property in Afghanistan. These technologies have been developed over 
time and are now becoming an integral aspect of modern conflicts. UCAV and PGM technology have 
been implemented outside of the war in Afghanistan and the frequency of use is increasing. Public 
opinion on such an inflammatory issue is never stagnant and is influenced by the government, the 
media and the entertainment industry, which have portrayed the technology both positively and 
negatively. The impacts of using these technologies in the war in Afghanistan need to be examined to 
understand the implications of these technologies for the future of war-fighting. In order to achieve 
this, a thorough understanding of the strategic, legal and ethical debates surrounding the use of these 
technologies is needed. Through analysis of the different schools of thought relevant to the use of 
these technologies, a greater understanding of the potential benefits and dangers of such weapons can 
be developed, as well as insights into the areas that require further examination. Moreover, areas that 
may benefit from increased interaction between the strategic, legal and ethical perspectives may be 
identified. At this time an increase in UCAV warfare seems inevitable. The purpose of such research 
is to better anticipate the resulting consequences to the largest extent possible, in an attempt to avoid 
making critical mistakes in years to come. 
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Chapter 3: Strategic Perspectives 
 
In order to understand the ‘strategic perspective’ it is necessary to look at the debates within the 
military and government concerning the strategic strengths and weakness of new weapons technology. 
Such discussion will help to provide insight into future military strategy and structure. This is an 
important part of military planning as “strategic thinking needs to keep up with technology in order to 
avoid being overwhelmed by it” (C. S. Gray 2005b: 373-74). The increasing importance of 
technology means that military strategy needs to adapt to incorporate these changes. The strategic 
perspective is important to consider separately as, although constrained by legal and ethical 
boundaries, these limitations can be adaptable and reactive. While strategies need to comply with 
current International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and ethical boundaries, when first implemented there is 
no legal or ethical precedent on which to judge the actions. As new strategies are put in place it is the 
reaction to the event, either positive or negative, that creates new legal and ethical standards. For 
example, if a strategy is used that is received negatively by the public and international community 
laws are developed in an attempt to limit its implementation. On the other hand, if a strategy is well 
received by the public and international community then this could be framed as the ethically superior 
strategy and encouraged as the best option. There are many strategic advantages available to the U.S. 
military due to their technological superiority, including high levels of surveillance, decreased 
casualty phobia, cost savings, lessening civilian casualties and new tactical manoeuvres that a manned 
plane could not achieve. However, there are also strategic weaknesses to using advanced technology, 
such as a lack of trust in the technology, susceptibility to enemy adaption and overwhelmed 
bandwidth. It is argued that technology will only increase in importance in the foreseeable future. This 
would lead to smaller armies that will need to be compensated “for their loss of personnel and 
equipment by leveraging technology to allow them to fight asymmetrically against larger forces” (M. 
Schmitt 1998: 1055). The need for changing strategies has led to a large amount of debate within the 
military as to what would be the best course of action. There is extensive debate amongst both 
military strategists and academics as to what the ‘face of war’ has become. This refers to the type of 
warfare that is carried out as well as the rules guiding combatant’s behaviour within such conflicts. 
The strategies used to implement new weapons technology within conflict are important to consider 
when attempting to understand the implications of advancing weapons.  
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The Changing Face of Warfare 
The continued development of weapons technology has played a significant role in what techniques 
and strategies are utilised in modern conflicts. Mahnken (2008: 223) identifies the development of 
new ways of war, for example increasing use of PGMs, UAVs and UCAVs, as evidence that that the 
character of warfare is changing. M. Schmitt (1999: 143) concurs with Mahnken, describing warfare 
as a constantly evolving phenomenon. New weapons technologies have allowed for new strategies 
and manoeuvres that would not have previously been available. Therefore, the development of 
weapons technology will continue to have a significant effect on how war is waged (M. Schmitt 1999: 
143). J. Marshall Beier (2003: 412) highlights the popularity of such claims as “these remarkable new 
capabilities are touted as a strategic watershed that is profoundly changing the very nature of war.” On 
the other hand, C. Gray (2005a: 19) argues that “war is not changing its character, let alone 
miraculously accomplishing the impossible and changing its nature.” While future warfare may occur 
in new contexts, C. Gray (2005b: 165-66) argues that, the “continuities will far outreach the 
discontinuities.” This would mean that while advanced weapons continue to be developed warfare is 
still essentially the same since the origin of conflict in its nature and purpose (C. S. Gray 2005b: 167). 
For this purpose the recent changes within warfare are referred to in this thesis as the ‘face’ of warfare 
rather than the ‘nature’ of warfare. While it can be argued that the fundamentals of warfare have 
remained the same, the ‘character’ or ‘face’ are significantly changing as technology continues to 
create new opportunities for strategies and warfare. 
 
The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is a theory that was largely prominent as a result of the 
Gulf War and continuing throughout the 1990s. Andrew Latham (2002: 231) describes the RMA as a 
term “that is used both to describe and explain the momentous changes in warfare that appear to be 
taking place in the current era.” However, such broad descriptions mean that the precise meaning and 
significance of the term are still fiercely debated within academic and military circles (Latham 2002: 
231). RMA enthusiasts argue there have been fundamental changes to the character and conduct of 
war since the end of the Gulf War. These enthusiasts argue that technology will give the U.S. a large 
strategic advantage and warn against the dangers of not evolving the military to meet modern threats 
(Mahnken 2008: 220). The result of a technologically advanced military would be the limitation of 
“the costs of war by defeating their adversaries in a rapid, decisive manner” (Stone 2004: 408). To 
limit the cost of war it is argued that precision missile strikes would become the future of warfare and 
the struggle for information supremacy would dominate the battlefield (Biddle 1996: 141). There are, 
however, RMA sceptics who warn against placing faith in advancing technology. Sceptics argue that 
technology rarely delivers on its promise. Moreover, it is argued that technology distracts from what 
is really needed, such as training, to achieve a more effective military force (Mahnken 2008: 220). It 
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is hard to overcome the conviction that war cannot be won without putting soldiers in the line of fire 
(Brzezinski 2003). Conflict situations where there is little or no danger for soldiers could lead to the 
U.S. being labelled as cowards. This is demonstrated by the attacks within Pakistan where it is felt 
that U.S. strikes are feeding the perception of Americans as cowards as they are “too frightened to 
shed blood in battle” (Ghosh and Thompson 2009). Stephen Biddle (1996: 141) describes the belief in 
the RMA as a “fundamental misreading” of the future of warfare. Debates continue regarding the 
causes, nature and consequences of the current RMA. The RMA was a dominant military theory of 
the 1990s and early 2000s; however, since the beginning of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq the idea 
that the U.S. could engage in short, hi-tech conflicts has been largely discredited (Hawkins 2006). 
William Hawkins (2006) asserts that “no plan survives contact with the enemy” and the theory of 
RMA appears to have fallen victim to this truism. In its place new theories surrounding the nature of 
warfare are emerging.  
 
In recent years “asymmetry” has replaced the RMA as the catch-phrase du jour, according to M. 
Schmitt (2008: 2). Stephen Metz and Douglas Johnson of the U.S. Army War College define 
asymmetry “in the realm of military affairs and national security” as “acting, organizing and thinking 
differently than opponents to maximise one’s own advantages, exploit and opponents weakness, attain 
the initiative, or gain greater freedom of action” (M. Schmitt 2008: 3). M. Schmitt (2008) outlines 
several forms of warfare that have been affected by asymmetry including technological, doctrinal, 
normative, participatory and legal or moral standing. The theory of technological asymmetry in 
warfare is the most notable form of asymmetry and is especially relevant to this thesis. Technological 
asymmetry refers to the unprecedented technological advantages the U.S. maintains in relation to the 
rest of the world.
4
 Modern battlefields no longer have one ‘front’ on which they are fought but rather 
are multidimensional. Therefore, in modern warfare traditional capabilities such as range, precision 
and mobility are less important to a modern force which requires the ability to “rapidly gather, 
process, and react to information about an opponent, while hindering the enemy’s ability to do the 
same” (M. Schmitt 2008: 8). Asymmetry in the battlefield is a very important aspect of the changing 
face of warfare. The current U.S. technological advantage is so significant, due to large development 
and security budgets, that it is unlikely any other nation will be able to compete in the foreseeable 
future.  
 
There have been several new strategies put forward and debated since the beginning of the war in 
Afghanistan, beginning with the Afghan Model. As previously noted, this strategy essentially 
                                                     
4 From this point any reference of asymmetrical warfare is defined as technological asymmetry within warfare.  
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consisted of a strong air bombing campaign to destabilise the regime, followed by a relatively small 
number of elite ground troops supported by an indigenous, surrogate force and ongoing air support. 
After the initial successes of Operation Enduring Freedom, this strategy was intensely debated as the 
future of U.S. combat strategy. Many have since discredited the strategy for implementation in future 
conflicts as it relies on many variables, such as no enemy air force and the presence of a surrogate 
force. COIN strategies have since been applied to the war in Afghanistan with key principles that 
insist on protecting civilians over combatants and using only the minimum force required (Fick and 
Nagl 2009: 43). These goals are increasingly similar to those outlined in the following chapters 
regarding humanitarian law and ethical critique. Rumsfeld (2002: 21, 30) suggests that rather than 
searching for one strategy, such as the Afghan Model or COIN warfare, and preparing to refight the 
last war, the U.S. needs a military who are open to new thinking and are prepared to address new 
issues as they arise.  
 
Strategic Advantages  
The development of new weapons technology has provided the U.S. with strategic advantages that 
would not have previously been possible. An example of this is the high level of surveillance gained 
through the deployment of UAVs. The opportunities that this advantage provides are important in a 
COIN conflict such as the war in Afghanistan; this is acknowledged in the 2006 COIN manual which 
states: 
Given the challenges faced by human intelligence assets in finding and penetrating 
insurgent networks, counterinsurgents must effectively employ all available intelligence 
collection capabilities. A combination of unmanned aircraft systems, manned aircraft, 
and space-based platforms can provide counterinsurgents with many collection 
capabilities (Departments of the Army and Navy 2006: E-2). 
By using unmanned aircrafts there is no risk to a pilot’s life, only those targeted, and this allows 
UAVs to be sent into areas that would previously have been too dangerous for a manned plane to 
enter. Soldiers on the ground can have real time aerial surveillance during combat situations, as UAVs 
and UCAVs can loiter in one position, giving them a significant advantage over the enemy. The 
ability to hover over buildings is also effective when attempting to intimidate those inside and flush 
combatants out (Brzezinski 2003). UCAVs allow Special Forces to not only have surveillance on a 
building but by stacking two or three drones over a compound they have the ability to track everyone 
who comes and goes (Drew 2010a). This tactic has reportedly been used to attack “Taliban leaders 
and bomb-making networks in eastern and southern Afghanistan” (Drew 2010a).  This manoeuvre 
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would be dangerous for a manned air craft as staying stationary for any length of time creates a target 
for enemy soldiers, therefore,  putting the pilot at too great a risk (Brzezinski 2003). On the other 
hand, if a UCAV is destroyed there is no pilot whose life could be lost or who could be taken as a 
hostage. The only casualty of such an event is a machine that is replaceable and of only financial 
significance. Chris Thirtle describes the Reaper as the “by far the most reliable aeroplane that we [the 
RAF] have ever operated” (Hopkins 2011a). As Mahnken (2008: 221) notes, “[o]ver the past fifteen 
years technology has helped create a series of lopsided battlefield outcomes between the United States 
and Iraq (twice), Serbia (twice), and Afghanistan.” The use of advanced weaponry has helped to 
increase this significant imbalance on the battlefield.  
 
The lack of danger for pilots and increased resources for soldiers, provided by new weapons 
technology, also helps to combat casualty phobia. Casualty phobia is “a profound aversion, bordering 
on the phobic, to incurring American casualties”, also known as the “body bag factor” (Record 2002; 
Robinson 2009). This affects the general American public as well as dominating much of the 
decision-making within the U.S. military and government (Record 2002). However, Jeffery Record 
(2002) argues that as the war in Afghanistan was a response to a devastating loss of American lives 
and an attack on the homeland there was more public willingness to spill American blood than in 
earlier interventions, such as in Somalia. This has led to debate over the extent of the phobia as some 
believe it is exaggerated (Record 2002). Casualty phobia is arguably felt even more strongly by the 
military leadership than civilians as they do not want to send soldiers into situations where they could 
be killed or they are unsure of the outcome (Record 2002). Without adequate surveillance the risk of 
casualties or failure of a mission increases significantly. Military leaders are increasingly reluctant to 
act without prior surveillance. The reliance on surveillance before a mission is described as akin to an 
‘addiction’ (Mahnken 2008: 202). Mahnken (2008: 202) quotes an officer who describes the Special 
Operations community as not able to act unless “a UAV is looking at it or an AC-130 is looking at it.” 
This reliance could lead to issues in future conflicts if the technology is not available in that region or 
where the enemy has a capable Air Force. In such situations the need for unmanned aerial surveillance 
becomes a liability as technology cannot always be relied upon. UAVs have not yet been used in 
conflicts where the enemy has a capable Air Force and, as UAVs have no way to defend themselves, 
it is unlikely they would be as effective in such a situation (Brzezinski 2003).  
 
The accuracy of PGMs means enemy combatants can now be more effectively targeted while 
minimising civilian casualties. Nicholas Wheeler (2002: 210) argues this means militaries “can now 
reduce risk of civilian casualties without sacrificing military effectiveness.” However, this is disputed 
by those who argue that the development of precision weaponry can come at the cost of strategy. It is 
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claimed that “on occasions a high body count, not entirely excluding the innocent, is the pathway to 
strategic effectiveness” (C. S. Gray 2005b: 163). Despite these arguments keeping civilian casualties 
to a minimum is a continuing priority of the U.S. military. The perception that bombing campaigns 
are now a ‘precision’ exercise means that they can be a regularly used strategy without a significant 
public outcry or casualty phobia.  
 
Another benefit of using unmanned technology is that UAV operators can spend less time training and 
gain more experience in real combat situations. Air Force pilots usually work in twenty-month cycles, 
of which only four months is spent in deployment (Kaplan 2006). UAV operators, on the other hand, 
can work in active combat for twenty months (Kaplan 2006). This means greater cost savings for the 
military as the time that previously would have been used for training is now used to build up high 
levels of “visual familiarity and expertise” while participating in active combat (Kaplan 2006). Thirtle 
argues that controlling UAVs and UCAVs creates a more conducive environment for pilots to carry 
out their missions (Hopkins 2011a). UCAV operators do not have to contend with the ‘discomfort’ of 
flying in a confined and hot environment, removing the effects of g-force and noise, therefore, making 
the experience less physically stressful (Hopkins 2011a).  
 
UCAVs provide strategic benefits over manned planes as they were designed to have capabilities that 
manned planes lack. One such design feature is the ability to fly slowly. While it may be assumed that 
speed would beneficial it is the Predators ability to fly slowly that provides a significant advantage in 
COIN operations (Kaplan 2006). In situations where the goal is to hunt and kill individuals or small 
groups of fighters, speed would hinder rather than help the operation (Kaplan 2006). The Predator has 
the added advantage of flying at 15,000 feet where no one on the ground can hear or even see it 
(Kaplan 2006). In addition, the low speeds at which it can fly means there is less wear and tear on the 
equipment. This is reflected in the fact that the predator requires less maintenance than any other 
aircraft (Kaplan 2006). UCAVs are also designed to need little maintenance while in storage. The 
planes are hooked up to internal diagnostic systems that run function checks (Brzezinski 2003). These 
climate-controlled containers can sustain an inactive UCAV for up to 20 years (Brzezinski 2003). 
This method of storage has also led to the nickname “bomber in a box” (Brzezinski 2003). Less 
maintenance again means greater cost saving as there are fewer technicians and replacement 
components needed.  
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Strategic Weaknesses 
While the U.S. enjoys a strategic advantage due to the possession of new weapons technology there 
are several significant problems that have yet to be addressed. Some within the U.S. military find it 
hard to trust new weapons technology as it is unfamiliar (Brzezinski 2003). Military leaders prefer to 
rely on technology they have used and seen in action creating vast pockets of resistance to 
implementing new and advanced technology within the military (Brzezinski 2003). In regards to 
UCAVs this distrust has been reinforced by some negative performance issues. In particular, UAVs 
and UCAVs crash more often than manned fighters (Brzezinski 2003). Several crashes have been 
reported in Pakistan where UCAVs are carrying out attacks (Ghosh and Thompson 2009). In addition, 
UAVs and UCAVs can only cover a small amount of territory at a time and thermal cameras are well 
known for producing blurry images (Ghosh and Thompson 2009). There is also a level of inaccuracy 
from available information after the attack has been carried out. Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, third in 
command of Al Qaeda, was killed in Pakistan during a missile attack in May 2010. He was previously 
reported as killed by an air-strike in Pakistan in August 2008 but later re-emerged and continued to be 
an important member of Al Qaeda (E. Schmitt 2010). Without ground troops in support it is hard to 
confirm the number and identity of casualties that are caused by the attacks.  
 
Another concern with the long-term use of UCAVs is that strategists do not always take into account 
the adaptability of the enemy. Strategies that enemies traditionally implement to mask their actions 
and movements, such as utilising darkness, poor weather and difficult terrain, are no longer effective 
(M. Schmitt 2008: 8). However, enemy combatants will soon learn how to counteract the advantages 
gained by the use of UCAVs. This could include the development of advanced surface-to-air weapons 
to knock down drones and eventually satellites (Brzezinski 2003). As stated within Joint Vision 2020 
“we should not expect opponents in 2020 to fight with strictly ‘industrial age’ tools” (M. Schmitt 
2003-2004: 741). This document recognises that the enemy will begin to gain advancing weapons 
technology and must adapt their strategies to combat this. The enemy’s adaptability also extends to 
new tactics to avoid thermal imaging and have implemented the use of decoys at all times as they are 
aware they can now be under constant aerial surveillance, even when UAVs are not visible. Enemy 
combatants have recognised that the U.S. military want to avoid taking civilian casualties, PGMs can 
target specific buildings but will most likely not be used if the building also contains civilians. 
Therefore, they have begun to use schools and mosques to stay and hide their weapons (Owens 2003). 
Despite focus on hi-tech weaponry terrorists are still able to utilise low-tech methods to reach gain 
some advantage. The planes used during the 9/11 attack, for example, were hijacked using box 
cutters, as Susan Gray (2009: 82) states this does “not reflect 21st century technology by any means.” 
Regardless of such adaptability the continued development of weapons technology is still perceived as 
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vital in order for the U.S. military to maintain its strategic advantage and requires large commitments 
of money and resources from the U.S. government.  
 
A further problem that arises with the use of UCAVs is that the airwaves, or bandwidth, over airfields 
are becoming crowded (Brzezinski 2003). This causes large problems for the operators as these 
airwaves are utilised to control the UAVs and UCAVs. John Keggler (2007: 46) describes the 
airwaves over battlefields as “so saturated with military voice, video and data streams that if this 
information were in the visible spectrum the air would resemble a London fog at the turn of the 19
th
 
Century.” This means communications in other areas could be compromised, as well as limiting the 
number of UAVs and UCAVs that can be in use at one time. There is also the threat of enemies 
deliberately ‘jamming’ such communication (Robinson 2009). This problem could be exacerbated if 
the satellites that provide the airwaves come under threat. The solution to the problem could be to 
make UCAV technology more autonomous, therefore, not providing the constant stream of 
information that is using up the bandwidth (Robinson 2009). The use of autonomous UCAVs raises 
ethical questions in regards to how much power we wish to give technology over human life. Is it 
acceptable to allow a machine to ‘pull the trigger’? This will be discussed further within the ethical 
perspective. 
 
The use of UCAVs and PGMs are creating feelings of resentment and revenge from the families of 
those whose loved ones are killed during the attacks. Mustafa Abu al-Yazid claimed that the suicide 
bombing of CIA base in Khost was revenge for the number of high level Al Qaeda leaders killed in 
UCAV attacks. It has been reported that militant leaders such as Baitullah Mehsud like to boast that 
“each drone attack brings him three or four suicide bombers” (Ghosh and Thompson 2009). The U.S. 
has recognised the importance of ‘winning hearts and minds’ and has created policies to this effect. 
The current COIN manual states that:  
[a]ny use of force generates a series of reactions. . . . Counterinsurgents should calculate 
carefully the type and amount of force to be applied and who wields it for any operation. 
An operation that kills five insurgents is counterproductive if collateral damage leads to 
the recruitment of fifty more insurgents. . . . [Thus,] it is vital for commanders to adopt 
appropriate and measured levels of force and apply that force precisely so that it 
accomplishes the mission without causing unnecessary loss of life or suffering 
(Departments of the Army and Navy 2006: 1-25). 
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The manual also reinforces the importance of using proportional force as “using substantial force . . . 
increases the opportunity for insurgent propaganda to portray lethal military activities as brutal, 
[while] using force precisely and discriminately strengthens the rule of law that needs to be 
established” (Departments of the Army and Navy 2006: 1-27). If there is growing frustration on the 
battlefield, due to the asymmetrical nature of the war in Afghanistan, this could also cause an increase 
of terrorism within America. The threat of domestic terrorism creates a “paradoxical situation in 
which the military’s capacity for riskless application of force makes our own lives substantially 
riskier” (Kahn 2002: 7). As no other military force can currently compete with the U.S. on the 
battlefield, due to the strategic advantage gained by new weapons technology, the enemy needs to 
implement strategies that could give them an advantage, even if they do not comply with current 
IHLs. While these issues impact on strategic discussions, they also weigh heavily on ethical and legal 
debates and will, therefore, be addressed again in later chapters of this research.  
 
Another strategic weakness in the use PGMs can also be associated with many other advanced 
technologies that the U.S. military is currently using. Kaag and Kaufman (2009: 603) argue that the 
use of torture to gain targets for precision bombing puts more pressure on interrogators to extract 
information using abuse and torture. Previously the U.S. would not have had the resources or 
technology to immediately act on specific information but now have the capability due to the 
development of UCAVs and PGMs. This would mean that advancing weapons technologies are, 
therefore, causing increasing suffering to suspects. While this is hard to prove and perhaps an 
unforeseeable by-product of the use of advanced technology it is important that all consequences of 
their use are analysed and weighed against the benefits of using advanced technologies.  
 
One of the most significant debates within the military is taking place between the U.S. military and 
its pilots. Air Force pilots, as a collective, do not completely agree with continuing to increase the use 
of UAVs over manned planes. The development of UCAVs has benefitted pilots in many ways. There 
is less danger to pilots, this is especially important as air defence networks and technology advances 
(Robinson 2009). It also means that pilots do not need to undergo the ordeal of arduous 30-hour 
missions as UCAVs are being designed to endure such lengthy assignments (Sweetman 2003). 
However, there are still valid objections that are being put forward on behalf of pilots. One such 
problem is the lack of glory. Currently, it is  by acting with courage while flying that pilots are  
recognised for awards or promotion (Brzezinski 2003). These acknowledgements are far less likely 
when piloting from the ground. Bill Sweetman argues that “every Air Force in the world is run by 
fighter pilots. You are never going to sell [UAVs] to them” (Brzezinski 2003). Air Force Colonel 
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Mike Francis
5
 argued in 1997, before the development and implementation of UCAVs, “most of us 
realize that [UCAVs] will ultimately happen, but no pilot wants them to happen on his watch” 
(Sweetman 1997). PGMs are also having a significant effect on the role of the pilot. The development 
of PGMs means that, unlike pilots of previous eras, there is no longer the need to identify their targets 
or even aim. A pilot’s new role is to fly within the weapon’s effective envelope and drop the bomb, 
which will then use its guidance system to reach the target, pilots in effect have little control over the 
bombing itself (Mahnken 2008: 200). Although this action still requires the skill to pilot an aircraft 
and avoid detection there is the possibility that pilots will become nothing more than “glorified truck 
drivers” due to these advancing technologies (Mahnken 2008: 224). The shifting role and identity of 
the fighter pilot is potentially an important consequence of advancing weapons technologies. Colonel 
Francis realised that the implementation of new technology, such as UCAVs, would be difficult as 
“not offending the culture is a big concern” (Sweetman 1997). The culture within the Air Force has 
meant that for over half a century the pilot has been seen as the “central actor in air combat” and have 
been described as “the ‘mounted knight’ of our age” (Robinson 2009). This is challenged by 
advancing weapons technologies that will continue to cause significant changes in the image and 
identity of the fighter pilot. These changes will affect not only how the pilots perceive themselves but 
also how they are perceived by the public. Tim Robinson (2009) identified the challenge to the culture 
of the pilot as the “most difficult obstacle to overcome” as UCAV research and development 
continues.  
 
Conclusion 
There are several debates to consider within the ‘strategic perspective’. These include those taking 
place within the military, the strengths and weaknesses of advancing technology that are already in 
use as well as the changing ‘face of warfare’ to predict the structure of future conflicts. The benefits 
of implementing UCAVs and PGMs have been numerous; they provide surveillance and 
manoeuvrability, are cheaper and provide some protection for pilot and civilian lives. However, there 
are also strategic weaknesses to using such technology; as yet these systems are not trusted by some 
within the military, the enemy will soon develop counter-strategies, there is finite bandwidth above 
battlefields, increasing feelings of resentment and frustrations from civilians who have lost loved ones 
as well as opposition from fighter pilots whose cultural identities are being affected. Despite these 
weaknesses UCAV and PGM technology continues to be argued by many as the future of warfare. 
The strategic benefits of these technologies outweigh any negative strategic arguments and have 
become an invaluable asset to advanced militaries.  
                                                     
5 Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office 
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The future of weapons development seems to have few limits. The weapons of today would have 
seemed to past generations as belonging within science fiction. As Colonel Christopher B. Cerlile 
states “the difference between science fiction and science is timing” (U.S. Army 2010: 4). As yet, no 
one has claimed that conflicts will soon be free of danger or death. Therefore, important goals for 
future weapons will continue to be the protection of military assets and the ability to distinguish 
between soldiers and civilians. PGMs continue to be developed but for more specific situations. For 
example, new earth-penetrating and thermobaric weapons have been created and used in conflict 
situations, such as Afghanistan (Rumsfeld 2002: 27). This enables the U.S. to destroy underground 
tunnels, storage facilities and hiding places of enemies that were previously unreachable. UCAV 
technology is also continuing to be developed. They are being designed to be more autonomous so 
that a mission can be programmed into the onboard computer and carried out without a pilot. It is 
assumed that higher levels of UAV autonomy will improve performance while reducing cost, risk and 
personnel (U.S. Army 2010: 7). However, the use of essentially ‘robots’ to kill humans raises many 
ethical issues that have not yet been thoroughly discussed. Despite this concern the U.S. army 
envisions that within 25 years the number of UAVs and UCAVs it maintains will first quadruple and 
then double again as “needs and capabilities increase” (U.S. Army 2010: 72). With these sorts of 
advancements in capability and number already planned it is vital that we understand the implications 
of such changes before they take place.  
 
Advancing weapons technologies have had and will continue to have a significant impact on the face 
of warfare. The most important impacts so far have been the increase in technologically asymmetrical 
warfare and the development of COIN strategies. In light of such changes powerful countries, such as 
the U.S., will need to be flexible and understand that strategies and militaries will need to adapt to 
new situations rather than prepare to refight past conflicts (Rumsfeld 2002: 30). The implementation 
of COIN warfare shows a willingness to adapt to changing environments within conflict. Modern 
legal and ethical standards need to be discussed to establish if they are reacting to these changes and 
challenges. The next chapter addresses the legal issues and asks if, in light of the new strategies that 
are being employed, IHLs are coping with the introduction of advancing weapons technology? 
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Chapter 4: Legal Perspectives 
 
“No legal requirement for a ‘fair fight’ exists” 
(M. N. Schmitt 2007: 468) 
 
The role of law in war is ever changing. Law has a significant role within warfare as it can be argued 
that “even in the midst of war, legal arguments retain an aura of legitimacy that is missing in 
‘political’ justifications” (Smith 2002: 370). While Cicero stated that “in war the law is silent”, it has 
since been argued that the destructive power possessed by advancing weaponry is so momentous that 
it must be regulated to minimise the risk of catastrophe (Baer 2002: 7). In modern conflicts the laws 
of war
6
 are increasingly invoked and are used to provide legitimacy to military action (Smith 2002: 
355). The role of law during conflict has increased to the point where the term ‘lawfare’ has been 
adopted by some and warfare is considered a “modern legal institution” (Kennedy 2006: 5). This is, in 
part, due to the development of new weapons technology. The perception of what military action is 
deemed as legitimate and legal has been significantly influenced by the development of new weapons 
technology. This is not a recent development, as law has proven to be responsive and adaptable to the 
changing nature of warfare (M. Schmitt 1999: 145). 
 
 The legal perspective is important to discuss as the guidelines created by IHL are the most visible and 
influential way of setting a standard of behaviour during war. IHLs, unlike ethical guidelines, are 
written and ratified, creating a sense of legitimacy and a framework for acceptable action during 
conflict. However, the clarity of international law is at times challenged due to often subjective and 
ambiguous legal terminology. The laws of war have evolved over hundreds of years and have 
developed from earlier work on the concept of just war; however, the foundation for modern IHL is 
the Geneva Conventions.  
 
This chapter will outline what aspects of the Geneva Conventions are relevant to advancing weapons 
technology and what further challenges have arisen for IHL. There has been some condemnation of 
                                                     
6 While there are slight variations when defining the terms Laws of War, Laws of Armed Conflict and International 
Humanitarian Law I use these terms interchangeably for this research.  
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the U.S. for utilising UCAV technology; in particular it has been questioned if using UCAVs for 
lethal operations breaches the principles of Proportionality, Discrimination or Military Necessity 
(Smith 2002; Vogel 2010). To combat increasing criticism and condemnation the Obama 
Administration has claimed that lethal UCAV operations comply “with all applicable law, including 
the laws of war, in all aspects of these ongoing armed conflicts” (Koh 2010). Despite these claims 
there are still many who question and criticise the use of UCAV technology on a legal basis, often 
focusing on the use of assassinations and the doctrine of overwhelming force. Discussion surrounding 
the use of new weapons technology has led to questioning of the relevance of the Geneva 
Conventions in modern warfare. The adaptability of IHL, the effect of normative restraint and the 
extent to which law is dictated by the powerful are discussed to address this issue.  
 
The Laws of War 
Geneva Conventions 
The Geneva Conventions are one of the key foundations of IHL but have endured frequent challenges 
and face obsolescence due to the advancement of weapons technology and the changing face of 
warfare. Additional Protocol (AP) I was signed in 1977 and relates to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts; AP II was signed in 1977 and relates to the Protection of Victims of 
Non-International Armed Conflict; AP III was signed in 2005 and relates to the Adoption of an 
Additional Distinctive Emblem (International Committee of the Red Cross: 2010). There are currently 
194 states that are party to the Conventions (Roberts 2009: 7). The Conventions purpose is to provide 
protection for classes within society who are not actively participating in warfare or conflict; these 
include civilians, prisoners of war and medical personal.  
 
The conventions are based on key principles such as proportionality, discrimination
7
 and necessity. 
Proportionality is addressed in AP I Article 51 which prohibits: 
attack[s] which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to 
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination of thereof, which would be 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated (Vogel 
2010: 110). 
                                                     
7 Also known as the Principle of Distinction 
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Article 35 of AP I outlines proportionality by stating that “it is prohibited to employ weapons, 
projectiles and material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or 
unnecessary suffering” (The Geneva Conventions AP I 1977). This means that that no 
unnecessary suffering can be inflicted on either civilians or combatants due to the use of 
weaponry or strategies, if implementing an alternative could have lessened this suffering. 
 AP I Article 57 also acknowledges proportionality as it requires military planners and decision 
makers to “[r]efrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be expected to cause incidental ... 
[but] excessive [losses] ... in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated” (Vogel 
2010: 110).  
 
 Vogel (2010: 107) highlights the importance of discrimination within the conventions. This principle 
is outlined within AP I, in particular Articles 48, 51 and 52:  
 Article 48 of AP I requires that all parties to a conflict ‘at all times distinguish between 
the civilian population and combatants, and between civilian objects and military 
objectives.’ Article 52 then defines those military objectives as ‘those objects which by 
their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action 
and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances 
ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.’ Focusing on the non-combatants 
in close proximity to the conflict, Article 51 of AP I requires parties to ensure that ‘the 
civilian population and individual civilians ... enjoy general protection against dangers 
arising from military operations’ and ‘not to be the object of attack’. Article 51 also 
prohibits and defines ‘indiscriminate attacks’. Ambiguously, and therefore more 
controversially, Article 51 forbids the targeting of civilians ‘unless and for such time as 
they take direct part in hostilities.’  
These three articles confirm that under IHL there must be some attempt to distinguish between 
civilian and combatant at all times. Deliberate targeting of civilians, or failure to adequately 
discriminate between civilian and combatant, are violations of the Geneva Conventions. 
 
The principle of military necessity is outlined in Article 52 of AP I. This law requires that 
armed attacks in wartime be “limited strictly to military objectives” and offer “a definite 
military advantage” (Vogel 2010: 106).8 The level of military advantage gained is important to 
                                                     
8 These concepts are reiterated in the U.S. Army field manual, Hague IV and the Rome Statute (Vogel 2010: 106). 
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justify the use of force during conflict. Advancing weapons technologies have challenged 
aspects of the outlined principles; these consequences will be discussed later in this chapter.  
 
Challenges to Law by Advancing Weapons Technology 
 
Condemnation 
Under the United Nations (UN) Charter the war in Afghanistan does have a legal basis (O'Connell 
2003). However, the legal strategies and technologies employed by the U.S. during the war in 
Afghanistan have caused debate over the legality of U.S. actions. The increasing use of advancing 
technologies, such as UCAVs and PGMS, has led to a varying amount of international condemnation. 
The level of criticism towards the U.S. has been inconsistent. It has been argued that the U.S. has 
received little backlash over the use of UCAV technology (O'Connell 2003). However, there have 
been several examples of criticisms from international organisations, the most internationally 
recognised and legitimate of which came from the U.N. Special Rapportuer Philip Alston, who 
condemned U.S. use of UCAVs to carry out lethal operations and questioned whether the U.S. was 
violating IHL (United Nations 2010). Alston’s 2010 report asked for the U.S. to be more “upfront” 
about its programme as it is not possible to answer questions about the legality of these actions 
without more information in regards to how targets are being selected (United Nations 2010). Alston 
also asked the U.S. to provide evidence that they are taking the correct steps to ensure compliance 
with the humanitarian principles of discrimination, proportionality, necessity and precaution (United 
Nations 2010). The international community warned that the U.S. need to become more open with 
information as it has created a situation where: 
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is running a programme that is killing a 
significant number of people, and there is absolutely no accountability in terms of the 
relevant international law (United Nations 2010).  
More specifically Alston asked that the U.S. need to provide the legal basis on which it was operating, 
make it clear who was running the programme and what accountability measures had been put into 
place domestically to ensure compliance with IHL (United Nations 2010). It was argued that self 
investigation “did not enhance credibility”; therefore, it is time for the U.S. become more transparent 
in its actions (United Nations 2010).  
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In response U.S. officials have stated that Air Force personnel who operate UCAVs follow a legal 
code, including “international obligations observed during an armed conflict” (Asian News 
International 2010). Head of the Office of Public Affairs for the CIA Paul Gimigliano
9
 and his deputy 
George Little were quoted as claiming that “the accountability is real, and it would be wrong for 
anyone to suggest otherwise” (Asian News International 2010). However, they would not discuss or 
confirm any specific action or programme except to state that there was close government oversight 
(Asian News International 2010). Koh
10
 took the opportunity as keynote speaker at the 2011 Annual 
meeting of the American Society of International Law, to address some of the concerns being raised 
over the use of UCAVs (Koh 2010). He stated that “great care is taken to adhere [the principles of 
distinction and proportionality] ... in both planning and execution” (Vogel 2010: 102). Koh (2010) 
also claimed that: 
Some have challenged the very use of advanced weapons systems, such as unmanned 
aerial vehicles, for lethal operations. But the rules that govern targeting do not turn on the 
type of weapons system used, and there is no prohibition under the laws of war on the 
use of technologically advanced weapons systems in armed conflict – such as pilotless 
aircraft or so called smart-bombs – so long as they are employed in conformity with 
applicable laws of war.  
While not specifically addressing the concerns raised by Alston, Koh (2010) vehemently denied that 
the U.S. had breached any international laws or the principles of proportionality and distinction in 
carrying out lethal operations using UCAVs. However, Koh did not address the issue of CIA 
management nor international accountability.  
 
The majority of criticisms have been directed at the CIA as it is a civilian agency and therefore, not 
part of the regular armed forces. Vogel (2010: 115) contends that “even some of those who are fully 
on board with nearly every other aspect of drone warfare find themselves uneasy with civilian 
personnel performing a combat function.” Under the Geneva Conventions combatants are only 
recognised as such if they fulfil the legal requirements, for example wear insignia, have a commander, 
carry weapons openly and comply with the law and customs of war (O'Connell 2003: 328; Vogel 
2010: 115). While operators of UCAVs fulfil some of these requirements, such as wearing a uniform
11
 
and chain of command, it is argued that the operators of UCAVs do not carry weapons openly and 
are, therefore, breaching IHL (O'Connell 2003: 328; Vogel 2010: 115). A further criticism of CIA 
                                                     
9 Paul Gimigliano stepped down as Head of the Office of Public relations in September 2010 and was succeeded by his 
deputy George Little.  
10 Legal Advisor within the U.S. Department of State. 
11 UCAV operators wear flight suits but CIA personnel are not otherwise distinguishable by a uniform.  
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involvement is the lack of training in the laws of war. In contrast, the military invests a lot of time in 
training its personnel to understanding and complying with the laws (Vogel 2010: 116). The military 
is also subject to not only international laws but also internal rules and regulations. The CIA may have 
similar rules in place, although due to the secrecy of the agency these particulars are not available to 
the public so remain ambiguous (Vogel 2010: 116).  
 
New weapons technology is required by the Geneva Convention to be evaluated by lawyers who 
establish that it has been developed in “good faith” and that it conforms “with the applicable rules of 
humanitarian law” (Koplow 2005: 746). It has been claimed that “the U.S. government has never tried 
to justify its use of Predator drones on a legal basis” (Ezzatyar and Kabraji 2010). However, David 
Koplow (2005: 746) argues that the U.S. does, in fact, subject any weapons under development to 
legal scrutiny during both early fabrication and, once fully developed, before deployment is 
authorised. According to U.S. domestic law all weapons bought or developed by the U.S. must 
comply with international law.
12
 Koh (2010) argues that: 
While further ethical or moral exploration may be required with regard to remotely 
conducted attacks performed far from the battlefield, the law of armed conflict does not 
present any additional limitations or prohibitions in this respect. There is no difference 
under the law of war if a ship fires a rocket at a military objective hundreds or thousands 
of miles away ashore, or if a domestic missile installation fires an intercontinental 
ballistic missile at a lawful target halfway across the globe, so long as the attacks are 
carried out within the rules of armed conflict. 
This means that there is no specific law of war that bans the use of UCAV operations for lethal 
strikes. However, these operations must still comply with all current laws of war as do all military 
operations. Despite these requirements there have been challenges to the legality of U.S. deployment 
of UCAVs to conduct operations within the war in Afghanistan. While PGMs have been used in the 
war in Afghanistan there are few legal objections to their operational use.  
 
                                                     
12 Air Force Policy Directive 51-4 26th April 1993 states “The Air Force will make sure all weapons it buys or develops are 
consistent with international law, particularly LOAC. To do so, HQ USAF/JAI will conduct a timely legal review of all 
weapons and their effects” U.S. Air Force, 'Air Force Policy Directive 51-4 Compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict', 
(Secretary of the Air Force, 1993).  
Moreover, Army Regulation 27-53 1st February 1979 states: “Prescribes procedures and assigns responsibilities for 
submission of weapons or weapon systems to The Judge Advocate General (TJAG) for legal review under international law. 
This regulation applies to: The development or procurement of all weapons or weapon systems which are intended to be 
used in combat, including major and nonmajor systems” Department of the Army, 'Review of Legality of Weapons under 
International Law', Army Regulation 27–53 (Washington, 1979). 
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Principle of Proportionality 
The doctrine of overwhelming or decisive force has caused a fundamental legal argument throughout 
the war in Afghanistan as implementing this strategy may breach the principle of proportionality 
(Hoffman 1996; Smith 2002: 359). This doctrine is arguably a defining characteristic of the U.S. 
strategic culture and is commonly known as the ‘Powell Doctrine’ due to Colin Powell’s13 belief that 
“military actions should pursue well-defined interests and use overwhelming force” (Smith 2002: 
359). The development of advanced weapons technology such as PGMs and UCAVs has conformed 
to this doctrine by increasing the U.S. military’s ability to achieve an overwhelming advantage on the 
battlefield. However, the use of overwhelming force conflicts with some facets of jus in bello and AP 
I, in particular the principle of proportionality and the need to avoid “superfluous injury” and 
“unnecessary suffering” (Koplow 2005: 745). The desire to ‘overwhelm’ could mean that the force 
used by the U.S. military is not in proportion to the crimes committed by the enemy and could 
unnecessarily endanger civilian lives and property. However, the exact amount of force needed is hard 
to calculate and, as Koplow (2005: 703) points out, there are consequences for any miscalculations: 
In confrontations with recalcitrant opposing forces, the authorities must recognise that if 
they exercise too much power, they incur an unacceptable danger of ‘collateral damage,’ 
unintended casualties to civilians and unnecessary destruction of valuable property. On 
the other hand, if they exercise too little power, they may risk the safety of their own 
personnel and compromise the accomplishment of an important and legitimate mission.  
The concept of a proportional response is of particular importance in the modern context of 
asymmetric warfare and the increasing gap between the technological haves and have-nots. If the 
punishment is in excess of the crime then the negative consequences of such action could outweigh 
any positive gains it achieves. Since the implementation of COIN warfare in the war in Afghanistan 
the need to use the minimum force possible to achieve the objective has been emphasised.  
 
The Obama Administration maintains that the “U.S. targeting practices, including lethal operations 
conducted with the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, comply with all applicable law, including the 
laws of war” (Koh 2010). The U.S. rules of engagement are founded principally on the 1907 Hague 
Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (“Hague IV”) (Smith 2002: 360).14 
These rules are outlined in the Air Force Pamphlet (AFP) 110-31, International Law-The Conduct of 
                                                     
13 Colin Powell was the U.S. Secretary of State 2001 – 2005 under the Bush Administration.  
14 “The general limitation of means (Art. 22), avoiding unnecessary suffering (Art. 23), prohibiting attacks on 
undefended civilian centers (Art. 25), and sparing cultural and religious sites, historical monuments, and hospitals 
(Art. 27)” (Smith 2002: 360). 
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Armed Conflict and Air Operations (Smith 2002: 360). This pamphlet provides guidelines for conduct 
based on proportionality and discrimination, similar to those found in the Geneva Conventions 
(Walne 1987: 22). AFP 110-31 recognises that civilian protections, at times, have been undermined 
by “the development of new weapons systems including aircraft and missiles which extend the 
struggle beyond the immediate battlefield” (Smith 2002: 360). The principle of proportionality takes 
into consideration the effects upon civilians and objects during an operation in relation to the military 
advantage achieved (Vogel 2010: 110). Any protection provided extends only to the immediate 
effects on civilians, such as injury or death due to bombing or bullet, it does not extend to any of the 
longer lasting effects of war, such as contaminated water, lack of shelter or lack of food (Smith 2002: 
361). Under the Geneva Conventions is it not against the law to cause civilian casualties during an 
operation; however, “reckless attacks that result in civilian deaths or destruction, or attacks that 
knowingly take civilian lives clearly in excess of what is necessary for accomplishing the military 
objective could violate the principle of proportionality and constitute war crimes” (Vogel 2010: 111). 
What operations are deemed ‘reckless’ or what actions are seen to be in ‘excess’ are judgements that 
are made by soldiers in the moment and then debated by lawyers’ months after the fact. As M. 
Schmitt (1999: 170) emphasises many of the rules governing proportionality are ambiguous:  
No one would suggest, for example, that capturing a single low-ranking soldier would 
justify the death of hundreds of civilians. Similarly, the military advantage of destroying 
a command and control centre would seldom be outweighed by damage to an 
uninhabited building. The complexity emerges when one moves from the extremes along 
the proportionality continuum toward the centre.
15
  
The principle of proportionality is further complicated by the ambiguous terminology used within AP 
I, for example, the need to avoid “superfluous injury” and “unnecessary suffering” (The Geneva 
Conventions AP I 1977). What level of force would create acceptable suffering and what would result 
in unnecessary suffering is hard to determine when in a conflict situation (Koplow 2005: 745). The 
difficulty in quantifying what is ‘proportionate’ is important to the ongoing development of weapons 
as, despite challenges, the Geneva Conventions remain the legal “touchstone” against which new 
weapons are assessed (Koplow 2005: 745).  
 
                                                     
15 Article 51 of the Geneva Convention states that ambiguity and doubt should be resolved in favour of the protection of the 
civilian population (Lippman 2002: 36). Therefore, any doubt over proportionality should be ruled in favour of civilians and 
against excessive use of military force.  
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Principle of Discrimination  
The principle of discrimination is very important when considering the legality of advancing weapons 
technology. Koplow (2005: 745) describes a valid weapon that complies with discrimination, as being 
“designed and employed in a fashion that enables it to be sufficiently precise, to attack only legitimate 
targets.” It can be argued that highly accurate targeting technology, like that developed for PGMs and 
UCAVs, achieve discrimination to a level no previous weapons could have (Enemark 2008: 201). If 
discrimination is best achieved by precision technology then this reinforces the perception that those 
who possess such technology have more legitimacy in regards to conduct within warfare (Beier 2003: 
411). The norm of discrimination both helps to limit the use of indiscriminate weaponry as well as 
limiting the indiscriminate use of weapons regardless of their precision capabilities (M. Schmitt 1999: 
147, 48). Deliberately targeting civilians or civilian objects is illegal, according to the laws of war. It 
has become important to define exactly when an individual is deemed a civilian and when they are a 
combatant. A civilian may only be legally targeted if they have participated in hostilities, thereby 
forfeiting any protection given to civilians (Vogel 2010: 108). After six years of “expert discussions 
and research” the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) published Interpretive Guidance 
on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law to clarify 
what actions should be considered as direct participation in hostilities (International Committee of the 
Red Cross 2009). The ICRC concluded that protection is removed from civilians for only the length of 
time they participate; “civilians who engage in such temporary or non-combat conduct, may only be 
targeted for the time they are engaged in hostile conduct” (Vogel 2010: 108). Despite the conclusions 
made by the ICRC this is still a contentious issue. It has been argued that individuals cannot be 
simultaneously a combatant and a civilian, therefore, an individual cannot participate in a conflict 
during the day and then regain the protections given to civilians at night (Vogel 2010: 108). There is 
ongoing debate as to the degree of participation that distinguishes a civilian from a combatant. 
Despite this tension UCAVs have been praised for being able to distinguish between civilians to a 
higher degree than other weapons currently available and can therefore be seen as fulfilling the 
requirements of the principle of discrimination (Vogel 2010: 110).  
 
The U.S. relies on the concept of dual use to address the issue of discrimination between civilian and 
military targets in urban areas. Targets that may have previously been considered off limits due to 
civilian use could now become a legitimate military target if enemy combatants are also benefiting. 
Modern warfare is now largely urbanised creating more assets and infrastructure that are used by both 
enemy combatants and the civilian population. Under IHL the destruction of dual-use facilities is 
legal; “[a]rticle 54 [of the Geneva Convention] prohibits military operations ‘to attack, destroy, 
remove or render useless objects indispensible to the survival of the civilian population’. This 
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includes attacking foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and irrigations works for 
the specific purpose of denying sustenance to the civilian population” (Lippman 2002: 37). As the 
intent of these attacks is not to ‘deny sustenance’ to civilians, but rather enemy combatants who also 
benefit, they are not ‘technically’ a violation of the Geneva Convention.  
 
While the protection of civilians continues to be a high priority of the U.S. military, the distinction 
between military and civilian assets is no longer clear, and often described as ‘blurry’ (M. Schmitt 
1999: 160). This is due to an enemy who understands the reluctance to endanger civilians so 
deliberately hides amongst them. Koh (2010) stresses that such behaviour makes “the applications of 
international law more difficult and more critical for the protection of innocent civilians.” It has been 
predicted that this blurring of distinction between civilian and combatant will continue in future 
conflicts: 
The concept of military objective will remain beleaguered as civilian activities are 
further militarized, and military activities are increasingly civilianized, especially in 
technologically advanced States (M. Schmitt 1999: 159). 
M. Schmitt (1999: 159) gives the example of a computer chip manufacturer to emphasise this point; 
how does one distinguish a company that sells exclusively to civilians from one that has military 
contracts. This is further complicated as these chips may be used for military purposes without the 
knowledge of the company, is the company still a legal and legitimate target? Smith (2002: 361) 
points out that there has been a “loosening” of what constitutes a legitimate military target to resolve 
the dilemma of distinguishing military from civilian resources to target enemy combatants’ assets. 
However, M. Schmitt (1999: 161) stresses “humanitarian principles dictate that any consequent urge 
to simplify legal criteria buy relaxing them should be opposed.” 
 
While it is rarely claimed that the U.S. or coalition forces have deliberately targeted civilian 
populations or property, it is questioned whether or not the U.S. has taken “every feasible measure to 
ensure that military rather than civilian populations and objectives were attacked” (Lippman 2002: 
64). For example, it is often argued that the deployment of more ground troops rather than a reliance 
or air strikes would have put more U.S. soldiers at risk but could have spared some civilian lives, 
making it the preferred strategy under IHL (Zehfuss 2010: 11). Whether or not an operation was 
discriminate or proportionate needs to be assessed on a case by case basis and while this applies to all 
operations it is important that lethal UCAV missions are examined closely due to their frequent use in 
civilian contexts (Vogel 2010: 112). Despite criticisms, Koh (2010) argues that the Obama 
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Administration has taken great care to “adhere to these principles [proportionality and distinction] in 
both planning and execution, to ensure that only legitimate objectives are targeted and that collateral 
damage is kept to a minimum.” Moreover, Koh (2010) states that these principles are followed during 
all operations carried out against Al Qaeda and its associated forces, including lethal strikes 
undertaken during UCAV operations. 
 
Principle of Military Necessity 
What constitutes military necessity, like proportionality and discrimination, is decided in many cases 
by lawyers and military leaders. UCAV and PGM technology have been implemented for a significant 
amount of time, but it has been argued that it is only recently that public officials, experts, 
practitioners, operators and lawyers have come to fully understand “the legal framework for the 
emerging use of drones [UCAVs]” in order to create guidelines for future use (Vogel 2010: 102). 
During the first Gulf War lawyers ensured targets were “vetted in light of the Geneva Convention and 
calculated whether or not the overall advantage to be gained outweighed any expected civilian 
spillover” (Smith 2002: 369). In Afghanistan it is standard practice to have military lawyers review 
targets and evaluate the level of risk posed to civilians (Lippman 2002: 57). This is important to 
ensure that a significant military advantage is gained to justify an operation using the principle of 
military necessity. This type of legal scrutiny can only be implemented by states that possess the 
money and technology to sustain such a highly bureaucratic system, such as the U.S.  
 
“Precision-Guided Law” is a concept put forward by Smith (2002: 368) to illustrate the modern use of 
law during warfare. Smith argues that over the past decade there has been a significant shift in legal 
focus from restraining violence to legitimizing it. Decisions made by lawyers provide “harried 
decision-makers with a critical guarantee of legal coverage, turning complex issues of morality into 
technical issues of legality” (Smith 2002: 369). S. Keeva argues that “the relationship of corporate 
counsel to CEO, the JAG’s [Judge Advocate General] role is not to create obstacles, but to find 
legal ways to achieve his client’s goals - even when those goals are to blow things up and kill people” 
(Smith 2002: 368). This legal scrutiny of military action has created a system that has “legal fine 
print” in a symbiotic relationship with technology (Smith 2002: 369). The laws of war have merged 
with military life to the extent that individual battle tactics are now assessed for legality (Kennedy 
2006: 7). A “common legal vocabulary” has developed for assessing the legitimacy of actions that is 
utilised by both international lawyers and military personnel (Kennedy 2006: 7). In modern warfare it 
appears that debate has shifted to address legal technicalities, such as the military necessity of each 
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operation, rather than the underlying legality of war itself and the violence, death and destruction that 
it creates.  
 
The military necessity of UCAVs is not often questioned. As discussed in the preceding chapter, there 
has been consistent praise from military officials on the significant military advantage UCAV and 
PGM technology provides to U.S. armed forces (Vogel 2010: 107). However, it has been 
hypothesised that “a greater use of ground troops and special forces in particular could have reduced 
the risks for civilians” (Zehfuss 2010: 11). Critics argue that the civilian casualties caused by UCAV 
operations are far in excess of any military advantage (Vogel 2010: 111). The U.S. have shown that 
they will allow for higher risks to civilians if the individual targeted is of a sufficiently high rank and 
therefore, capable of substantial future harm (Vogel 2010: 111). The harm caused by such operations 
is seen in not only the civilian casualties but also the hostile sentiments of communities who have lost 
loved ones  in a UCAV strike (Vogel 2010: 111).  
 
When applied to a conflict situation, Chris af Jochnick and Roger Normand (1994: 50) argue “that 
‘the structured impotence’ and ‘permissive language’ of black-letter laws of war have lent a ‘facade of 
legitimacy’ to existing wartime practices” (Smith 2002: 357). Therefore, in regards to conflict 
situations the laws have been created in a way that prioritise military necessity over humanitarian 
needs and values (Smith 2002: 357). This has led Jochnick and Normand (1994: 55) to conclude that 
legal warfare is not more humane than illegal warfare and that “progress in humanitarian law is 
fiction” (Smith 2002: 357). In 1953, Hersch Lauterpacht predicted that:  
we shall utterly fail to understand the true character of the law of war unless we are to 
realize that its purpose is almost entirely humanitarian in the literal sense of the battle 
and passion. This, and not the regulation and direction of hostilities, is its essential 
purpose (Smith 2002: 358).  
Unfortunately this prediction, that the purpose of IHL would be forgotten in the need for 
military justification, is proving true as the use and manipulation of IHL by militaries is 
increasing with each new conflict.  
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Assassination 
Assassinations are illegal under IHL. Suspects cannot be killed anytime, anywhere, and it can 
therefore be argued that the U.S. is violating international law by carrying out “extrajudicial 
assassinations” by using UCAVs to kill terror suspects (Ezzatyar and Kabraji 2010; O'Connell 2003: 
326). Executive Order 11905 states that “no employee of the United States Government shall engage 
in, or conspire to engage in, political assassination” (U.S. Government 1976).16 Ezzatyar and Kabraji 
(2010) argue that it is due to this executive that the U.S. have tried to avoid the term assassination 
when describing the attacks. The Obama Administration asserts that these assassinations are legal as 
they are taking place within the context of an armed conflict (Koh 2010). Koh (2010) maintains that: 
Some have argued that the use of lethal force against specific individuals fails to provide 
adequate process and thus constitutes unlawful extrajudicial killing. But a state that is 
engaged in an armed conflict or in legitimate self-defense is not required to provide 
targets with legal process before the state may use legal force. 
Current U.S. policy only prohibits assassination of civilians in peacetime; however, it allows for the 
assassination of combatants during war so long as collateral damage is avoided (Ignatieff 2004: 
118)
17
.  
 
Under IHL a suspect must be given the chance to surrender and, using UCAVs to carry out attacks 
means there is no way an individual could surrender (O'Connell 2003: 330). However, the U.S. 
defends the use of UCAV technology for lethal operations. In Yemen, for example, the assassination 
of Harithi was justified by the U.S. as he was a member of Al Qaeda and, as arrest was not a feasible 
option in this situation, assassination was a “legitimate tactic” (Hajjar 2006: 34). While it has never 
been possible to surrender to any form of aerial attack, traditionally these attacks focused on military 
targets, not on individuals. It is this distinction, while seemingly insignificant, that has had a large 
impact on the legality of UCAV missions.  
 
Lethal UCAV operations are also criticised as illegal as they often take place when the situation is 
below the threshold of armed conflict (O'Connell 2003: 330). When a suspect is not engaged in active 
combat, is removed from a warzone or the chain of command, then it is argued that it is not “legally 
or logically” feasible to describe them as enemy combatants; rather they should be regarded as 
civilians (Ezzatyar and Kabraji 2010). Following this logic the actions of the U.S. could be seen as 
                                                     
16 President Gerald R. Ford's Executive Order 11905: United States Foreign Intelligence Activities, February 18, 1976. 
17 Hays Parks Memorandum on Executive Order 12333 and Assassination, 1989. 
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violation of both human rights law and international law as they are intentionally targeting men who 
are defined under the protected status of civilian. The assassinations carried out by UCAVs have been 
described as “shortcuts with a cavalier disregard for legality” and are condemned by many (Ezzatyar 
and Kabraji 2010). However, the U.S. continues to deploy UCAVs to carry out these lethal 
operations.  
 
Can the Laws of War cope with advancing Weapons Technology? 
The laws of war have existed in various forms for centuries. They are traditionally flexible and have 
so far adapted to any social or political issues that have arisen. However, the challenges facing the 
laws of war by new weapons technology means that the laws may need to once again be revised to 
weather these challenges. It can be argued that the law will adapt to this as it has to other challenges 
and that the pressures of legitimacy and normative restraint means that the law will remain. On the 
other hand, the law is dominated by powerful nations and adds legitimacy only to the states that can 
afford to uphold it. This allows such states to continue to use strategies that are controversial and 
weakens the authority of IHL. It is increasingly argued that the Geneva Conventions are no longer 
compatible with the realities of modern warfare. Matthew Lippman (2002: 39) describes the Geneva 
protocols framework of analysis as being “swept aside” by modern warfare, especially by the 
advancing technology of aerial warfare. Alberto Gonzales
18
 is quoted as referring to the Geneva 
Conventions as “quaint” and “obsolete” (Hajjar 2006: 32). Over half a century since it was originally 
signed the Conventions are still the basis of IHL, although modern wars may be very different to 
those envisioned by the creators. Since the end of World War II the majority of conflicts have been 
civil wars, this means that the rules regarding interstate wars and uniformed armies that are described 
in the Conventions are less applicable (Roberts 2009: 7). The U.S. is not a signatory to AP I but 
claims to recognise the concepts of proportionality and discrimination as binding due to customary 
international law (Lippman 2002: 66). The U.S. claim a constitutional right to declare the Geneva 
Conventions inapplicable to the war in Afghanistan as terrorists do not respect IHL, voiding the 
premise of reciprocity on which it is based (Hajjar 2006: 31). Lisa Hajjar (2006: 32) argues that the 
Geneva Conventions were purposefully pushed aside by the Bush Administration to:  
avoid the legal penalties and risks of prosecution for IHL violations (i.e. no crime 
without law), to ‘maximize’ options form the conduct of war and the treatment of 
captured enemies..., and to assert that this war was ‘unprecedented’ and thus constituted 
a new legal terra nulla. 
                                                     
18 At this time Gonzales was the White House Council, he would later become Attorney General.  
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The changing face of warfare creates an environment where it has become necessary to incorporate 
new technologies and strategies to set a new legal standard; this would ensure that the legitimacy of 
IHL is maintained. Adam Roberts (2009: 6) raises the idea that “by little-noticed process of common 
law, the Conventions have already adapted, although incompletely, to changes in war. The question 
now is: should there be further adaptation or a completely new convention?” 
 
Adaptability of Law 
It is now recognised that any international law is subject to political and social changes and pressures, 
and are consequently no longer perceived as a “closed universe of norms” (Smith 2002: 357). Smith 
(2002: 357) states that “law shapes the popular perception of an act by imbuing it with the “physical 
trappings” of legality, reinforcing a chimera of shared values and international society and cultivating 
a sense of obligation to the “civilized” order. While international law is recognised as legitimate by 
the majority of the states it is, arguably, voluntary and changeable. As the “chimera of shared values” 
changes over time the law must be adjusted to suit the new environment (Smith 2002: 357). The 
Geneva Conventions were created to provide protection during warfare for specific classes of people, 
including civilians. However, civilian deaths during conflict still occur and disturbing statistics are 
emerging that suggest up to 80% or 90% of all deaths within a conflict are now civilian (Roberts 
2009: 7).
19
 Roberts (2009: 7) highlights that even if these statistics are exaggerated, as many claim 
they are, it still shows the limits of the protection the conventions actually provide. The need to revise 
the conventions has been commented on by members of the Bush Administration, as well as the U.K. 
Defence Minister John Reid in 2006 (Roberts 2009: 8). However, as Roberts (2009: 8) notes these 
statements were never followed by genuine suggestions as to what changes should be made and how 
these would eventuate. It has been argued that these statements were designed to “cast a shadow over 
the application of existing routes” rather than to inspire a new treaty (Roberts 2009: 8). While law is 
adaptable it is clearly being suggested that to adapt to modern warfare the Geneva Conventions must 
be reviewed or a new legal standard put in place. On the other hand, Roberts (2009: 8) argues that “in 
marking sixty years of the conventions, it is not just their endurance that should be praised, but their 
little-noted but remarkable capacity to adapt to changing circumstances.”20 The Geneva Conventions 
have adapted overtime but may not being evolving fast enough to counteract the significant 
challenges being created by advancing weapons technology.  
                                                     
19 These statistics have yet to be irrefutably proven due to difficulties identifying between the bodies of combatants and 
civilian casualties as combatants do not always wear a uniform.  
20 Roberts cites changes to the law surrounding the repatriation of POWs and the denial of rights to POWs at Guantanamo 
Bay that are guaranteed under the Geneva Conventions (Roberts 2009: 8). 
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Normative Restraint and Legitimacy 
Normative restraint is another important concept when discussing international law in a modern 
context. Terry Nardin (2008: 398) states that: 
To speak of the international rule of law, we must make several assumptions. We must 
assume ... that law can be effective without legislation, adjudication, and centralised 
enforcement – that laws can be created, their meanings in particular cases authoritatively 
determined, and observance secured in other ways. 
Normative restraint provides a way of securing observance by those who could otherwise wield power 
without consequence. International law, due to a lack of an international governing body capable of 
enforcing law on all states, is not binding and sanctionable on the entire international community. 
Indeed, Ashraf (2009: 177) states that: 
The absence of effective and independent international legal enforcement has allowed 
states and non-state actors to ignore or interpret the laws as they see fit. The increasing 
influence of the media and the empowerment of public opinion has become the final 
arbiter of acceptability. 
 Normative restraint can have a significant impact on the actions of states within the international 
community. This reinforces President Obama’s claim that “[a]dhering to standards, international 
standards, strengthens those who do, and isolated those who don’t” (Koh 2010). For example, if a 
state was considering an action that would breach international law and there was no way to force 
compliance on the state then the international community, through its negative reaction, could 
potentially alter the states action. This demonstrates that while international law is criticised as being 
non-enforceable by traditional means such as a court, the law can still be enforced within the 
international community through other means and is, therefore, still relevant in a modern context.  
 
The concepts of legality and legitimacy are both important to warfare; however, they are very 
different in application and intent. Legitimacy is often a normative restraint so is not enforced through 
law but rather international pressure from states, media and non-governmental organisations. This 
means that what is deemed legitimate is not necessarily related to the standard set out in IHL, rather it 
is dependent on the political and social context, often changing to adapt to changes in the moral 
standing of the international community. The introduction of COIN to modern warfare has made the 
concept of legitimacy of equal importance to that of legality. The need for all actions to appear not 
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only legal but also legitimate can be exaggerated by what M. Schmitt (2007: 443) describes as the 
‘bully syndrome’. This is a tendency by the global media and non-governmental organisations to hold 
the more technologically advanced force to a higher standard of legitimate behaviour (M. Schmitt 
2007: 443). This means that, at times, a blind eye is turned to atrocities committed by the ‘underdog’ 
that would be deemed illegitimate if committed by the technologically advanced ‘bully’ (M. Schmitt 
2007: 469). Several highly visible ‘mistakes’ during the early stages of the war in Afghanistan as well 
as an increasingly global media meant that U.S. conduct was scrutinised internationally. This scrutiny 
created an environment within which even lawful collateral damage needed to be avoided (M. Schmitt 
2009: 312).  
In Afghanistan, for instance, authorization to conduct attacks which would otherwise 
comport with the proportionality principle was sometimes denied as risking “bad press” 
or negative communicative consequence. The requirement to take feasible precautions in 
attack seems to be slowly slipping toward a standard of all possible precautions (M. 
Schmitt 2009: 329). 
Within the COIN manual the term legitimacy appears 131 times (M. Schmitt 2009: 310). This shows 
an emphasis on legitimacy to accomplish the specific objectives of a COIN conflict such as the war in 
Afghanistan. As of 2008, legitimacy, perseverance and restraint are the ‘principles of war’ for U.S. 
joint operations. In addition, legitimacy became one of the traditional principles of targeting (M. 
Schmitt 2009: 310). The emphasis on legitimate was put into practice during the war in Afghanistan: 
For instance, the International Security Assistance Force Commander directed his forces 
to employ precision munitions whenever possible; IHL imposes no such requirement. 
Additionally, he directed on-scene commanders to make every effort to ensure houses 
from which their troops received fire were free of innocent civilians before responding, 
even though, as a matter of IHL, returning fire in such circumstances is governed by the 
rule of proportionality and the requirement to take feasible precautions in attack, not by 
the mere presence of civilians (M. Schmitt 2009: 312). 
This shows that advancing weapons technology is allowing an adherence to aspects of international 
human rights law that was not previously possible. While legitimacy, not IHL, may now be setting the 
standard for conduct in war this standard is still unattainable by all but the most advanced militaries.  
 
Law Dictated by the Powerful 
The divide between technological haves and have-nots is exaggerated by the understanding and 
implementation of legal warfare. By contrast older weapons and strategies, such as blanket bombing 
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campaigns, appear “criminally blunt” (Smith 2002: 362). The ability to utilise PGMs alone, which to 
an extent are already seen as an older technology, creates an image that the U.S. are fighting in a 
cleaner, more legitimate or legal way than their counterparts. It could be argued that the U.S. is the 
only country in the world that is able to wage legal warfare on a large scale as they continue to set the 
standard, a standard that could only ever hope to be reached by a few of the most technologically 
advanced militaries in the world (Beier 2003: 422).  
 
Smith (2002: 362) identifies a dilemma within the application of IHL framework. He argues that 
humanitarian laws have been “crucial in condemning atrocities, including sexual violence, associated 
with ethnic and other civil conflicts.” However, these types of crimes and conflicts would generally be 
associated with a low-tech, or a technological have-not, force or military. Such militaries often need 
to implement military strategies that are seen as outdated or barbaric in an attempt to gain some 
advantage. On the other hand, hi-tech states are rarely prosecuted. Smith concludes that if “hi-tech 
violence is shielded from prosecution, this may sap the moral force of the law and allow low-end 
offenders to paint themselves as victims of politicized proceedings” (Smith 2002: 362). Koh (2010) 
highlighted that the U.S. needs to follow “universal standards not double standards” and understands 
that doing so made the U.S. “stronger and safer”. The ability to control the legality of military action 
is almost as important as the technology itself. There would be little reason to develop UCAV or 
PGM technology if there was not the legal context within which to legitimately implement them. This 
legal inequality is especially apparent in the International Criminal Court (ICC) Statute which is 
“weighted toward hi-tech states in that machete murder is more likely to be criminalized than a 
nuclear holocaust” (Smith 2002: 359). Currently, the ICC will not oppose modern warfare so long as 
civilian casualties are unintentional or indirect (Smith 2002: 359). Although setting the standard for 
legal warfare has created a context within which the U.S. is unlikely to be put under scrutiny, there is 
growing frustration and anger from those who wish to see international law applied equally to all 
states, not just those who do not possess advanced weapons technologies. If these laws are seen as 
biased or manipulated this could lead to diminishing confidence in the legitimacy of IHL.  
 
Conclusion 
The questions surrounding the laws of war and their relation to advanced weapons technologies are 
ongoing. While it can be argued that the Geneva Conventions are no longer applicable to modern 
warfare there has yet to be an alternate solution proposed that has been met with sufficient support. It 
is important to acknowledge that the current IHL framework is no longer sufficient to protect civilians 
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due to advancing weapons technology and the subsequent changing nature of warfare. The U.S. did 
not ratify AP I but abide by the standard of conduct outlined within the document as a matter of policy 
to maintain legitimacy. However, it can be argued that: 
The United States [does not] ignore IHL; rather, they seek to reinterpret it in a manner 
that permits the pursuit (militarised or otherwise) of political agendas, even while 
claiming the reinterpretation to be legally valid (Hajjar 2006: 21). 
The interpretations of international law, such as those put forward by the U.S., have been continually 
challenged. The UN has begun to call on the U.S. to justify its actions legally. However, there is little 
or no legal accountability for a state as influential and powerful as the U.S. except through normative 
restraint. The perception of legitimacy is becoming more important in a legal and a strategic sense as 
it has become clear that ‘winning the hearts and minds’ of the people is now vital to achieving 
military goals. Despite the questions raised about the legality of its actions, the U.S. shows no signs of 
stopping or even decreasing its use of UCAVs for lethal operations. The Obama Administration has 
stated that: 
 the rules that govern targeting do not turn on the type of weapons system used, and there 
is no prohibition under the laws of war on the use of technologically advanced weapons 
systems – such as pilotless aircraft or so-called smart bombs – so as they are employed in 
conformity with applicable laws of war (Vogel 2010: 117).  
This has led to the conclusion that “the law of armed conflict is more than adequate to govern their 
[UCAVs] wartime deployment” (Vogel 2010: 117). Currently, the use of UCAVs has yet to be proven 
to breach IHL despite legal challenges over the use of assassinations, overwhelming force and 
discrimination. While it is important to attempt to limit violence using law it is also important to 
remember that by discussing a strategy, such as aerial bombing, using only a legal narrative it can 
oversimplify or even obscure the “moral choices” involved in such a destructive act (Smith 2002: 
369). Jeffrey Gingras and Tomislavz Ruby (2000: 108) argue that “given the danger of collateral 
damage, these superfluous strikes “may have been legal, but [they were] not morally justifiable.” A 
military strategy may be deemed legal but it can still be condemned as immoral. The consequences of 
breaching ethical standards can be argued as comparable to violating IHL. 
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Chapter 5: Ethical Perspectives 
 
“There has always been a tension between man’s desire to use violence for political purposes and his 
desire to restrain violence for ethical reasons” 
(Ashraf 2009: 162). 
 
Ethics are by nature ‘subjective and value-based’; the ethics of warfare are no exception and 
have, therefore, always been the subject of moral questioning (Ashraf 2009: 161). The morality 
of taking another life, whether it is in self defence, for land or power, or in the pursuit of 
democracy and freedom, has always been debated. New questions are now being considered as 
a result of advancing weapons technology and will be discussed in this chapter. One key debate 
asks if it is morally justifiable to kill without being in danger. UCAV operators are further from 
the battlefield than ever before and are in no personal danger. Moreover, is it acceptable, or 
does it weaken the moral conviction of the conflict, if one side is not willing to put its soldiers 
in danger? Further ethical debate analyses the role of weapons technology in a morally 
motivated conflict. Does a moral end justify the use of immoral strategies to achieve it? Is war 
becoming more acceptable to the public because of technology? Is conflict being prolonged to 
protect soldiers? As weapons technology becomes more widely available would symmetrical 
and, to a large extent, bloodless warfare resolve the underlying issues behind conflict? Carl von 
Clausewitz believed that “well-meaning attempts to avoid or minimize slaughter are a 
dangerous mistake; that war is not, and cannot be, user-friendly” (Enemark 2008: 204). In this 
case the continued development of weapons technology to lessen civilian casualties may lead to 
longer and more destructive wars in the future.  
 
There are also moral dilemmas in regards to the continuation and direction of weapons 
research. Can it be morally acceptable to continue to develop a product that is only capable of 
causing harm? Or is it justifiable as by developing more discriminate weapons civilian lives 
could be saved? As more autonomous technology is developed there are also questions as to 
whether or not it is acceptable for a robot to decide if a human lives or dies. Is it morally 
repugnant that technology could ever make such a complex decision, or are autonomous robots 
the answer to the ethical dilemmas that are often confronted by soldiers by removing the 
possibility of a human error in judgement? While the ethical benefits of technology, such as 
increased discrimination between civilians and soldiers, are valuable there are still those who 
are arguing for caution:  
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For all that technology can do to improve human life, there is no reason at present to 
believe that it can solve ethical problems that have challenged humans for thousands of 
years, or to eliminate the fog of war (Kaag and Kaufman 2009: 602). 
The introduction of new weapons technology and strategies means that longstanding moral standards 
need to be revaluated and discussed, including the morality of conflict, the use of precision warfare 
and the increasingly autonomous nature of technology. 
 
Humanitarian Warfare 
Ethical warfare has historically been based on the theory of just war. This theory led to the 
development of two branches of the ‘laws of war’, jus ad bellum (just cause of war) and jus in bello 
(just conduct of war). Although not of legal status, these laws of war provide a moral basis on which 
the decisions regarding the causes of war and the conduct within the war can be measured. The laws 
are enforced by the concept of reciprocity, meaning that forces agree to abide by these guidelines as it 
benefits them if their enemy does the same (M. Schmitt 2008: 42). However, it has been argued that 
the just war doctrine has been undermined by the changing nature of warfare (Goldstein and 
Pevehouse 2006: 287). Asymmetrical warfare has put pressure on what was previously a relatively 
stable legal management of warfare (Kennedy 2006: 12). During asymmetric conflicts the force that 
does not possess a technological advantage may violate IHL to gain some advantage; this lessens the 
incentive to comply for all involved (M. Schmitt 2008: 42). Smith (2002: 358) identifies an increase 
in the use of procedural rules, as found in jus in bello, and the subsequent decline of rules for going to 
war, jus ad bellum. This increase is, in part, for practical reasons; often a breach of jus ad bellum laws 
is based on motives and planning making them harder to prove. On the other hand, upholding the laws 
of jus in bello is easier as there may be forensic evidence. The undermining of the just war theory is 
also due to ever changing interpretations of morality. Louis Henkin argues that reasons for conflict, 
especially intervention, are easy to fabricate as there can always be some sort of humanitarian grounds 
on which conflict can be justified (Smith 2002: 358). In relation to advancing weapons technology 
this is important as the “legal interpretations of ad bellum rules, and an expansive view of military 
necessity are coalescing in a regime of legal warfare that licenses hi-tech states to launch wars as long 
as their conduct is deemed just” (Smith 2002: 355). This means that states and forces that do not have 
such a thorough understanding of the law and do not possess advanced weaponry are perceived as 
acting illegally or immorally.  
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Humanitarian intervention is based on a perceived moral obligation to help fellow human beings who 
are suffering. In order to give this help, a state must intervene in another state despite the principle of 
sovereignty. Supporting the principle of sovereignty is the statist paradigm that argues “state leaders 
and citizens do not have moral responsibilities or obligations to aid those beyond their borders” 
(Wheeler 1997: 10). Statists argue that there is no moral right given to state leaders to intervene on 
behalf of mankind (Wheeler 1997: 10). However, since the early 1990s humanitarian intervention has 
been utilised as a legitimate justification for conflict and judged on moral criteria. Recent debate has 
focused on criteria derived from the just war theory (Pattison 2007: 569). According to James Pattison 
(2007: 569) criteria for just war include the following: 
1) The number of violations of basic human rights is large enough to justify humanitarian 
intervention.  
2)  There is a reasonable prospect of successfully tackling the humanitarian crisis.  
3) The use of force is the last resort.  
4) The intervener is a legitimate authority or has been authorized by a legitimate authority 
(which is typically taken to mean the United Nations Security Council).  
5) The intervener has the right intent.  
6) The intervener uses means to conduct the war that are consistent with its humanitarian aim. 
The most important of these criteria in relation to advancing weapons technology is that “the 
intervener uses means to conduct the war that are consistent with its humanitarian aim” (Pattison 
2007: 569). This means that moral ends should be achieved through moral means. Moreover Kahn 
argues that: 
a regime capable of targeting and destroying others with the push of a button, with no 
human intervention but only the operation of the ultimate hi-tech weapon, propels us 
well beyond the ethics of warfare. Such a deployment of force might be morally justified 
– it might be used to promote morally appropriate ends – but we cannot appeal to the 
morality of warfare to justify this mode of combat (Kahn 2002: 3).  
 If a conflict is justified based on humanitarian motivations then the strategies implemented within the 
conflict should also be humanitarian in nature. If the moral intent behind a conflict is brought into 
question it can lead to greater scrutiny of actions, causing ethical transgressions to be perceived as 
worse than they would have perhaps been otherwise (Enemark 2008: 204). The increase in 
asymmetrical warfare has the potential to bring into question any conflict that is justified by 
humanitarian motives, if a state can intervene without risk to its own force then this could led to 
claims of neo-colonialism. As Kahn (2002: 7) asserts “[g]ood intentions are not enough.” On the other 
hand, it can be argued that we are witness to “a fortuitous coming together of technology and 
morality” (Zehfuss 2010: 5). This is due to the normative and legal pressure on states to abide by 
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humanitarian principles. As Zehfuss (2010: 5) argues “technology has ‘created pressure to be good by 
removing a possible excuse to be bad’.” If advancing weapons technologies are used humanely then 
they allow states to abide by humanitarian law to an extent previously unachievable; however, if they 
are not utilised humanely then the concept of humanitarian warfare will remain out of reach.  
 
The most significant questions being asked are in relation to the lack of danger to intervening soldiers. 
Is there a moral right to kill when you yourself are not in danger? This is emphatically denied by just 
war theorist Michael Walzer who suggests that “you can’t kill unless you are prepared to die” (Owens 
2003: 610). This argument is expanded by David Wetham, who states that “a whole new generation of 
weapons demonstrate a willingness to kill but not to die for a cause” (Sanderød 2009: 234). Therefore, 
UCAV and PGM technologies have contributed to the idea that it is acceptable to be willing to kill 
while not being in danger. Furthermore, Paul Kahn (2002: 4) argues that “without the imposition of 
mutual risk, warfare is not war at all.” On the other hand, Chris Thirtle acknowledges the ethical 
dilemma but argues for the use of UCAVs: 
 Is it right that you can hold your opponent at risk without any physical risk directly to 
yourself? That is a valid point, but there is another side of the argument.[..] Flying a 
Reaper I can turn up over a target area and choose the moment I strike. I can wait hours, 
days, weeks for the best moment to minimise the risk to those not involved in the conflict 
(Hopkins 2011a).  
The increasing use of UCAV technology by the U.S. demonstrates a belief that the strategic 
advantages gained by the technology outweigh any moral dilemma for the operator. 
 
Many ethical dilemmas have arisen from the ability to take lives, using new weapons technology, 
while not in danger.
21
 The most important of which is highlighted by David Luban (2007: 178) who 
argues that in a fully asymmetrical war killing uniformed troops is no more hazardous than killing 
civilians and, therefore, equally morally deplorable. Kahn (2002: 5) also argues this viewpoint stating 
that:  
If combatants are no longer a threat, however, then they are no more appropriate targets 
than noncombatants. Both may be the victims of a repressive regime. To identify 
combatants as appropriate targets under these circumstances is not morally different from 
identifying the winners of a macabre lottery as the appropriate targets. 
                                                     
21
 Further issues are discussed in more detail later in this chapter under the heading ‘The Effects of Distance’. 
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If operators are not participating in conflict but still taking lives it could be argued to be as the moral 
equivalent to murder. On the other hand, many would disagree with this assertion. Arguably there is a 
significant moral distinction due to the combatant’s intention to cause harm. This question needs to be 
openly and publicly addressed as asymmetrical warfare is increasingly common in modern warfare 
and the risk to soldiers is lessening.  
 
As a result of the ability to take lives while not in danger the question has been raised; does it show a 
lack of moral conviction if a state is willing to intervene but not at the cost of its own soldier’s lives? 
There is concern that participating in conflict where there is little risk to soldiers is immoral even if 
the intention seems morally acceptable, such as humanitarian intervention (Owens 2003: 612). It can 
be argued that the lack of danger to soldiers takes away from the moral commitment made when 
participating in humanitarian intervention.  
[Through the Kosovo conflict] not only did NATO blacken the idea of humanitarian 
intervention by equating it with zero casualties and aerial bombing, but the choice of 
means suggested that preventing genocidal atrocities was not worth the lives of a few 
Alliance troops (Smith 2002: 366). 
As Kahn (2002: 2) argues, “riskless warfare, which increasingly characterizes U.S. military policy, 
pushes up against the limits of the traditional moral justification of combat.” However, the COIN field 
manual calls for the U.S. military to assume “greater risk” showing a significant change in policy 
away from the riskless warfare that could be a consequence of continued weapons development (Fick 
and Nagl 2009: 43). These moral questions do not just apply to humanitarian intervention but all 
conflicts. The development of weapons technology and the subsequent asymmetrical warfare that has 
occurred raises significant moral issues in relation to humanitarian warfare that have yet to be 
resolved.  
 
Precision Warfare 
Precision weaponry still has a significant level of inaccuracy but can be described as ‘precision’ 
technology in comparison to unguided munitions. A PGM could land 10 metres from a target but still 
be within an acceptable range. Often distances of this amount will not have much of an effect as the 
blast radius ensures that the target is destroyed none the less. As Carl Conetta emphasises “[m]ost 
everything will be severely damaged, injured, destroyed, or killed within 20 meters of a 500-pound 
bomb blast and 35 meters of a 2000 Ib [sic] blast” (Zehfuss 2010: 9). In the context of Afghanistan 
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this is highly significant as Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders have used populated areas to hide within. If 
these weapons were being used in the desert and did not hit the target directly then the only 
consequence is the waste of munitions (Zehfuss 2010: 7). However, in urban warfare such as that used 
during the war in Afghanistan a PGM that does not land on its target will most likely result in the loss 
of civilian life and property (Zehfuss 2010: 7). By using the term ‘precision’ it creates the perception 
that all munitions land ‘precisely’ on target. However, this is an exaggeration makes the use of PGMs 
in urban areas more acceptable as the use of imprecise munitions would be seen as immoral.  
 
Civilian casualties within warfare are seen as inevitable and unavoidable. However, as the century has 
progressed there is an increasing loss of public support for any collateral damage during conflict 
(Beier 2003: 421). The development of advancing weapons technologies has created what can be 
described as a ‘false impression’ that zero collateral damage is possible (M. Schmitt 2009: 324). This 
would mean that any civilian casualties that do occur would be perceived as due to a lack of 
precautions. Patricia Owens (2003: 596) argues that this had led the U.S. and its allies to be cautious 
and describe any civilian casualties in the course of warfare as ‘accidents’. This is significant as an 
accident does not allow for responsibility, or even criticism. In doing so civilian casualties are 
normalised and, therefore, made permissible (Owens 2003: 595). This contributes to the perception 
that moral means are being employed to achieve a humanitarian outcome. This is due to the 
perception that accidents are unavoidable and occur despite our best efforts (Owens 2003: 597).  
 
There is no question that there have been civilian casualties during the war in Afghanistan. The U.S. 
claims that despite the use of aerial bombardment there have been limited casualties or collateral 
damage (Lippman 2002: 57-58). However, it has been argued that the use of UCAVs and the “high-
tech, out-of-harms-way strategy” that they enable, has led to a large number of civilian deaths. In 
February 2010 surveillance from a UAV was used by military commanders who ordered a helicopter 
strike on a convoy believed to contain insurgents and weapons (Drew 2010b). This strike killed 23 
Afghan civilians and wounded a further 12. In September 2010 a military investigation into the 
incident showed that the UAV operators played down two warnings about the presence of children, 
the pilots have since been disciplined for failing to adequately relay these warnings to the battle 
commanders (Drew 2010b). This incident and others like it have inflamed the tensions over civilian 
casualties. However, no one has claimed that the U.S. intentionally targets civilians; therefore, as 
these deaths are unintended the U.S. can label them as accidents, mistakes or errors (Lippman 2002: 
58-59).  
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The U.S. tends to shift blame away from the consequences of its actions by highlighting the actions 
taken by Al Qaeda and the Taliban, providing reminders that it was not the U.S. that started the war 
but rather were provoked through acts of terrorism. This strategy lays the blame or liability of any 
civilian lives lost, even if it was U.S. soldiers or technology directly responsible, at the feet of Al 
Qaeda and the Taliban (Lippman 2002: 63; Owens 2003: 605). On the other hand, New York Times 
columnist Nicholas D. Kristof went as far as to claim that “despite the loss of civilian life the 
American intervention in Afghanistan was a supreme humanitarian gesture” (Lippman 2002: 63). 
Thereby, claiming that removing the Taliban from power was the most humanitarian option, even 
with the loss of some civilian lives, as it created the opportunity for better lives for all within 
Afghanistan. While civilian casualties are still abhorred, the lack of accountability in modern warfare 
means that these ‘accidents’ may become more acceptable in the future and less able to be held up for 
legal and ethical scrutiny. 
 
The increasing use of precision bombing campaigns from both manned and unmanned planes has 
raised several ethical questions. Historically, soldiers have been seen as having a different ‘moral 
status’ than civilians. Soldiers take greater risks and the loss of civilian life was less morally 
acceptable than the life of a soldier who actively participated in the conflict. Just war theorists argue 
the Pentagon “has weakened, if not reversed, that assumption” (Smith 2002: 361). The U.S. 
government has continually developed technology to protect soldiers’ lives. This increasing concern 
for preserving soldiers’ lives counteracts casualty phobia and morally justifies strategies, such as the 
use of UCAVs, despite the increased risk to civilians. However, protecting soldiers is not without 
controversy: 
by removing what is perhaps the greatest restraint on the use of force – the possibility of 
soldiers dying – law and technology have given rise to the novel moral hazards of a 
“postmodern, risk-free, painless war (Smith 2002: 370). 
This has inspired debate as to whether or not a bloodless war would actually achieve anything or if it 
merely prolongs conflicts and never sufficiently addresses the fundamental issues (Enemark 2008: 
203). By using strategies that protect soldiers and make warfare more ‘humane’, such as bombing 
campaigns and UCAVs, the conflict can be prolonged (Meron 2000: 241). This can extend the 
suffering of the people that the intervention was meant to help (Meron 2000: 241).  
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Gingras and Ruby (2000: 111) state that “[c]ertain actions are simply wrong and must be avoided.” 
On the other hand, there is yet to be a universal morality to which every state adheres. Under this 
assumption, who decides what is acceptable and what is not? By providing an interpretation of IHL 
the U.S. are able to set the moral standard as there is an assumption that what is legal is moral or at 
least justifiable. Through this logic it can be argued that it is the U.S. government who determine right 
from wrong (Ezzatyar and Kabraji 2010). If it is powerful nations that are deciding what is moral and 
what is not who within society makes these decisions? Liberal citizens are becoming “mere 
‘spectators’” of war showing a lack of engagement and participation in such an important decision 
made by their leaders (Owens 2003: 610). For the most part governments and leaders make moral 
judgements but on the rare occasion when there is substantial public outrage over an issue, the public 
can have an influence (Ezzatyar and Kabraji 2010). It should be noted that there has been little 
domestic outrage or protest over the use of UCAV and precision technology as the protection this 
provides soldiers is welcomed by the majority of the U.S. public (Ezzatyar and Kabraji 2010). Once 
again the strategic use of assassinations by the U.S. is important as they are setting the moral standard 
to which other developed nations will conform. By carrying out such assassinations without judicial 
processes or sufficient authority Ezzatyar and Kabraji (2010) argue that such action “perpetuates the 
image that America is an insincere hegemon that devalues the lives of people in the region.” Although 
the U.S. is currently seen as morally driven this image could be eroded if their actions do not match 
the rhetoric of morality. 
 
Threshold for War 
The idea that the development of new weapons technology has the potential to lower the threshold for 
war creates an ethical dilemma (Sanderød 2009: 227). If the threshold were lowered it would mean 
that more conflicts could occur more frequently and with less justification. This is a dilemma as the 
development of weapons technology is thought to create more humanitarian warfare; however, if it is 
creating more violence then it is no longer ethically acceptable. Michael Ignatieff highlights this issue 
by stating that; “[t]he accuracy of new airborne weapons systems lowered – or appeared to lower – the 
political costs of using them. Clinton went to war [in Kosovo], believing that new technology would 
bring speedy, risk-free victory” (Sanderød 2009: 227). However, the ongoing nature of the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq has largely discredited the idea that the U.S. could engage in short, hi-tech 
conflicts (Hawkins 2006). The belief that new weapons technology could create fast, ‘clean’ wars is a 
temptation to engage in more conflicts. Previously, the loss of human life was a significant deterrent 
and set a high threshold for engaging in war. The effect of new weapons technology may mean that in 
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contemporary warfare it is the cost of time and resources that create a new threshold and restrain 
nations from engaging in warfare.  
 
The Consequences of Distance 
 
The use of weapons technology such as UCAVs has led Der Derian to argue that “there is a high risk 
that one learns how to kill but not take responsibility for it” (Owens 2003: 612). This is achieved by 
removing the operator from the battlefield so that there is a disconnection from the violence that they 
are participating in. This is not an entirely new concept. After the Kosovo war there was already 
concern over the depersonalisation of the strategies that were used. Smith (2002: 367) stated that 
“[t]he conduct of the [Kosovo] war also confirmed that old-fashioned chivalry had been eclipsed by 
the depersonalization and distance of modern technology and technical law.”  
 
While UCAV operators are able to view the destruction caused by their actions they are removed 
from any danger and do not experience “the noise and smell of the battlefield” (Sanderød 2009: 232). 
It is further argued that as there is no longer a difference between a simulation and a live mission the 
operators will experience ‘alienation’ from the battlefield. This alienation will have ethical 
implications: 
My claim is that distance, due to the characteristics and the increasing use of air power, 
has created and will create ethically challenging situations. The danger is that airmen put 
a mental distance between themselves and what happens on the ground and then let this 
distance influence their judgment (Sanderød 2009: 232). 
This could have significant consequences as an operator, who is not on the battlefield, could choose 
targets that would be deemed unacceptable by someone present on the battlefield. The distance does 
not allow for the operator to feel the emotion of the victim nor experience the full extent of the 
consequences, although they can now view the aftermath. There are arguments against the claim of 
alienation. When asked if such conditions encourage a ‘Play Station’ mentality, Thirtle emphatically 
denied such claims and described the accusation as ‘insulting’ (Hopkins 2011a). Furthermore, Thirtle 
claimed that “one of [the operators] hardest jobs is not to get emotionally involved in the fight. They 
have to stay within the rules … no matter how aware they are of what is going on on the ground" 
(Hopkins 2011a). He also stated that all of the RAF operators at the Creech Air Force Base are fighter 
pilots who have retrained to operate Reapers, however, it is now possible to train to be an operator 
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without any fighter pilot experience; this could exaggerate the issue of alienation from the battlefield. 
New operators may not have any experience of such an environment and, therefore, an incomplete 
understanding of the consequences of their actions.  
 
Sanderød (2009: 233) states that “the physical distance corresponds to a mental distance and therefore 
has ethical implications.” Sanderød (2009: 233) demonstrated this argument clearly with this simple 
diagram; 
  
 
 
While this diagram may be an oversimplification
22
, it illustrates clearly that there is a correlation 
between an increasing physical distance from the battlefield and a decreasing resistance to kill. It is 
ethically important that an operator is aware of the consequences of their actions as it is emotion and 
human judgement that are relied upon to make decisions in any given situation. While ethics are 
personal and are often based on culture and personal nature, it is important that emotions continue to 
contribute to decision making during conflict or previously unethical actions may become acceptable 
due to the distance weapons technology provides.  
 
                                                     
22 It must be noted that this diagram is based on data from WWII and UCAV operators now have a much clearer 
understanding of what is occurring on the battlefield due to advanced in camera and sensor technologies.  
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Autonomous Decision Making  
As stated in a previous chapter UCAV technology is becoming more autonomous. As technology 
moves in this direction the moral consequences of allowing a robot to make a moral decision about 
life or death, are being considered. Moral decisions have, until now, always been made by humans, 
there has been no alternative. It is still perceived as an “unshakably human endeavour” due to the ever 
changing nature of such decisions (Kaag and Kaufman 2009: 590). However, there is growing support 
for the use of robots to make such decisions. Ronald Arkin (2009: 30) argues that this should not 
come as a surprise as artificial intelligence is surpassing the capabilities of humans in many ways. 
Robots can go places that we cannot and can make split second calculations at a speed that the human 
mind could not (Arkin 2009: 30). As previously argued it is often not the technology that 
malfunctions, rather it is the human element that has led to mistakes and failures: 
One of the problems in Afghanistan was that sensors and aircrew were not usually the 
limiting factor in putting weapons on target. Rather, the reason for delay in the kill cycle 
was often human; the time necessary to make a decision based on a deluge of intelligence 
data. The problem was not a dearth of information – a problem in times past– but the 
need for commanders to sift through the abundance of information and rapidly arrive at 
an appropriate decision. One of the major reasons for this need to pause was the 
increasing necessity to ensure the target struck was the correct one and that minimal 
collateral damage would occur when it was hit (Meilinger 2009: 198). 
 
Moreover, it is argued that: 
before responding with lethal forces, robots can integrate more information from more 
sources far more quickly than a human can in real time. This information and data can 
arise from multiple remote sensors and intelligence (including human) sources, as part of 
the Army’s network-centric warfare concept and the concurrent development of the 
Global Information Grid. ‘Military systems (including weapons) now on the horizon will 
be too fast, too small, too numerous, and will create an environment too complex for 
humans to direct’ (Arkin 2009: 32). 
Furthermore, it is claimed that due to a lack of emotion robots can conduct warfare effectively and 
could also be more humane than human soldiers (Arkin 2009: 30). Soldiers often act on emotions 
such as anger, fear, frustration and revenge; at times causing a disregard of IHL or military regulation 
(Arkin 2009: 30). There is also a lack of self-preservation as a motivation for action. They can be used 
in a self-sacrificing way by commanding officers without moral anguish (Arkin 2009: 31). Arkin 
(2009: 31) concludes that “[p]eople have not evolved to function in these conditions, but robots can be 
engineered to function well in them.” This belief in technology to solve problems has been described 
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by David Noble as the ‘religion of technology’ (Kaag and Kaufman 2009: 597). Noble describes the 
secular religion of technology as having the same goals as traditional religions such as the idea of 
“salvation by overcoming human imperfection and creating a new and better being (often an immortal 
one)” (Kaag and Kaufman 2009: 597). Policy makers are also investing a lot of faith in technology to 
solve ethical issues that arise in the ‘fog of war’ which often clouds or impedes decision making 
(Kaag and Kaufman 2009: 585). 
 
Alternatively, there is strong and consistent opposition to robots being given the ability to make life 
and death decisions. Humans have the ability to make moral decisions based on “a unique 
interpretation of virtue” (Kaag and Kaufman 2009: 590). While humans by no means make the right 
decision every time, the choice of whether or not to take a life is less morally questionable when made 
by another human. The decision as to what and who  legitimate targets are is often not straight 
forward but rather a “matter of degree” (Kaag and Kaufman 2009: 599). Kaag and Kaufman (2009: 
599) argue that: 
 at the one end of the spectrum is the man firing the gun; at the other is end is a civilian 
playing no role in the attack. In between is a continuum of cases varying by the level of 
involvement or support being provided in the attack... It is unlikely that any set of rules 
can be prescribed in advance to determine when lethal force is permissible. 
This can be forgotten by military strategists who are caught up in the capabilities of weapons 
technology and forget the humanity needed in such situations. Rather they perceive “fallibility 
[as] something to be fully overcome in the course of scientific investigation” (Kaag and 
Kaufman 2009: 589). Although Ronald Arkin (2009: 31) advocates in favour of the use of 
autonomous robots he acknowledges that many within his field of robotic development do not 
agree with him and raises some of the issues that the opposition have put forward. For example, 
who are held accountable if an autonomous robot makes an error in judgement? (Arkin 2009: 
32). Could a robot refuse an order that it deems unethical? There is the possibility that this 
technology may be too complex to design, the intelligence necessary to discriminate targets 
may not yet be possible (Arkin 2009: 32). The effect on human soldiers should also be 
considered, they would be required to fight alongside a machine that the soldier will inevitably 
be replaced by (Arkin 2009: 32). The use of robots would also make ‘winning hearts and 
minds’ nearly impossible without the human element (Arkin 2009: 32). Finally the proliferation 
of such technology to other nations or terrorist organisations could have disastrous 
consequences (Arkin 2009: 32). Kaag and Kaufman (2009: 586) conclude that: 
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warfare must be regarded as a strictly human activity and that moral responsibility can 
never be transferred to the technology that is employed therein. 
By developing more autonomous weapons and technology there is the possibility that these 
decisions have already begun to be made by machines. It is important to remember that while 
technology can aid in making ethical and moral decisions they cannot begin to make these 
decision for us as there are too many questions still unanswered.  
 
Weapons Research 
Jane Arrigo (2000: 302) states that the central moral question in weapons research is “[f]or what 
moral constraints on weapons research are we willing to lose a battle, a city, a war, the nation...?” 
This question needs to be answered by individual researchers and governments alike and the standard 
of what is acceptable adapts as new technology is developed and norms emerge.
23
 The purpose of 
weapons is to harm others; however, it is argued that only through continued research will there be 
developments, such as more precise weaponry, that could save lives. These motives are often put 
forward as justifications for the continued development of weapons technology. Development of 
PGMs and other advancing technology is hard for ethicists to criticise as the reason for developing 
weapons capable of distinction between civilians and combatants is traditionally ethically motivated 
(Kaag and Kaufman 2009: 594). Richard De George (2007: 302) argues for continued weapons 
research as without such developments more civilian lives could be lost and further suffering inflicted, 
such research is a “moral imperative” if it can save lives24. In fact, not doing so “would be to choose 
to accept less precise bombs that cause more collateral damage to innocent noncombatants. This 
violates the injunction not to harm noncombatants if at all possible” (De George 2007: 302). 
Furthermore, it is alleged that the U.S. should be attempting to attain the capability to engage in war 
with zero collateral damage and that technology is the way to attain this goal. Therefore, it is ethical 
to continue to develop technology to lessen civilian casualties (Maine et al.: 1). It is argued that 
countries that are developing or have such weaponry have a moral obligation not only to use it, 
despite the additional monetary cost, to spare lives but also to share the technology with other 
countries (De George 2007: 302, 05). Symmetrical warfare using advanced weapons technology has 
                                                     
23 For example, creating weapons capable of mass destruction, such as nuclear capabilities, could be seen by a researcher as 
unethical; however, if such weapons are being created by other states or forces then the same researcher then could see it as 
necessary to obtain the technology to help to defend oneself and ones country. What has been seen by researchers and 
governments as acceptable in regards to weapons development has changed over time and perceptions of new technologies 
will inevitably evolve.  
24 De George puts forward several principles for the development of immunity for non-combatants during warfare, the most 
relevant of which is his Principle of Morally Obligatory Smart Weapons Development (De George 2007). 
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not yet been seen, there is an understandable hesitation to share technology that may one day be used 
by enemy forces (De George 2007: 305).  
 
In contrast, it can be argued that weapons research is undertaken with the intention of causing harm 
and is, therefore, immoral as is any production of armaments (De George 2007: 302-3).
25
 John Forge 
(2004: 538) gives the example of the inventor of scissors, while they have been used to harm people 
this was not the intention and, therefore, the inventor cannot be blamed. Weapons developers, 
however, know how the weapons will be utilised and must share in the responsibility of the 
destruction and loss of life. Creating technology, such as PGMS, has the potential to make war more 
acceptable to the public and in doing so increases the likelihood that war will occur. It could be 
argued therefore, that PGMs “should not be developed, and it is unethical to contribute to their 
development” (De George 2007: 304). Moreover, Kaag and Kaufman (2009: 587) argue that “PGM 
strikes can satisfy traditional ethical standards, but in so doing make us numb to additional ethical 
quandaries that accompany their use.” A further ethical issue raised by weapons research is the impact 
on social services and trust. The large amount of taxpayers’ money that is used to fund weapons 
research is not able to be accounted for to the public for security reasons (Arrigo 2000: 306). This 
secrecy leaves the public with no way to review the financial or moral implication of the research they 
are funding (Arrigo 2000: 302). This means that the only moral views that are expressed or accepted 
are from ‘insiders’ (Arrigo 2000: 307).26 The sheer amount of money that is spent on weapons 
research also needs to be questioned morally as there are many other social and economic issues 
within the U.S. that need funding (Maine et al.: 9). This has also been argued by Scientists for Global 
Research that asserts: 
 there needs to be a major shift in both resources and emphasis away from military 
science and technology towards areas such as clean technology, research on non-violent 
conflict resolution, and science and technology for poverty alleviation (Maine et al.: 9).  
This contention over funding is not a recent development, in 1996, to commemorate the 50
th
 
anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima, school teacher Susan Crane disarmed a Trident D-5 
missile. She argued that: 
‘Each day thousands of children die around the world from hunger-related diseases. Still 
we build Trident missiles. These missiles are cared for in air-conditioned or heated 
                                                     
25 While De George argues for continued weapons research he is referenced several times during the discussion of the 
immorality of weapons research due to the comprehensive nature of discussion in his work Non-Combatant Immunity in an 
Age of High Tech Warfare. 
26 This was previously questioned by ethicist Alasdair MacIntyre in 1994 (Arrigo 2000: 307). 
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rooms, never neglected, never homeless. We take better care of these weapons than our 
own children’ (Arrigo 2000: 305). 
In 1996 the U.S. DoD spent US$39.4 billion on research and development (The White House 2011). 
It is estimated that in 2011 the DoD total spending on research and development will be US$85.064 
billion (The White House 2011). This number does not only apply to weapons research but gives an 
indication of how significantly spending on research and technology has increased in the last 15 years. 
 
 If weapons are to be used in self-defence it could be argued that the development of these weapons 
would be morally acceptable. Forge (2004: 536), however, argues that there is no such thing as a 
purely defensive weapon.
27
 Internationally it is recognised that every state has the right to self 
defence. Therefore, developing the capabilities to enforce this right should also be permissible (De 
George 2007: 303). On the other hand, the U.S. would, at this time, have the capability to defend itself 
from attack from any other nation. De George (2007: 303) highlights that this could mean that the 
U.S. has “no justification for its continuing to develop and produce new armaments.” Nevertheless, if 
the U.S. were to stop weapons development it may no longer have the capabilities to defend itself 
from new technologies developed by other states, therefore, providing the moral right to continue 
development. This rather circular logic shows the subjective nature of weapons research, the moral 
judgement of which is often a personal decision.  
 
Conclusion 
While the use of hi-tech weapons in war can be deemed legal, if they are not also widely viewed as 
moral then there can be condemnation from the public and the international community. There have 
always been moral questions in relation to warfare. However, the development of weapons has 
created previously unrealised situations. Is a soldier killing an enemy combatant while not in danger 
the moral equivalent to murder? Does a moral end justify immoral strategies? Does weapons 
technology save civilian lives or draw out conflicts and stop any resolution of the underlying issues? 
Is UCAV technology making war more acceptable to the public? All of these questions are still being 
debated. Any conclusions to such moral questioning are primarily based on personal judgement and, 
therefore, demonstrate the subjective nature of weapons research. Despite this, weapons technologies 
such as UCAVs are being implemented before these issues are fully resolved. While autonomous 
                                                     
27 Forge argues that defensive weaponry could lead to the development of aggressive weaponry or if the weapon itself is 
used defensively the presence of the weapon could allow for more soldiers to take part in aggressive manoeuvres rather than 
defensive.  
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weaponry is seen as beneficial by some there are others who are cautioning that reliance on robots to 
make ethical decisions would be a mistake and that the decision to take human life needs to remain a 
purely human judgement. Caution is advised for policymakers and strategists who are reminded that 
technology cannot be relied upon to eliminate the ‘fog of war’ or solve ethical conundrums which 
have plagued war for hundreds of years. While some argue that weapons research is morally 
repugnant as its product can only destroy, others argue that is only through continued research that 
advances will be made that will save lives. The legitimacy of government action relies on being able 
to morally justify actions, however, the use of advancing weapons technology is increasingly being 
criticised as immoral. It is possible to mistake the ease of using technology with a sense that it is 
morally superior (Kaag and Kaufman 2009: 592). U.S. military leaders are mistaking the capability to 
achieve a goal with the moral permission to do so, this “reverses the Kantian ethical maxim the ‘ought 
implies can’ by insisting that ‘can implies ought’” (Kaag and Kaufman 2009: 591).  
 
There are many similarities and differences between the strategic, legal and ethical perceptions that 
have been discussed in this research. It was necessary to discuss and analyse each of these viewpoints 
separately to understand how they individually address the issues around advancing weapons 
technology. However, a thorough discussion of how these different positions interact is now required 
to understand the relationships between them. 
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Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusion 
 
On the 25
th
 March, 2011, an RAF Reaper fired missiles at two vehicles that were understood to be 
carrying Taliban commanders (Hopkins 2011a). ISAF launched an investigation into the attack and in 
July 2011 it was confirmed that in addition to the Taliban leaders there were civilians inside the 
vehicles. As a result of this UCAV operation 4 civilians were killed and 2 were injured (Hopkins 
2011a). This is the first time that the U.K. Ministry of Defence have confirmed that civilians were 
killed by an RAF UCAV in Afghanistan (Hopkins 2011a). This event is unfortunately not unique as 
similar civilian deaths have occurred throughout the war in Afghanistan. What it illustrates, however, 
is that ISAF forces continue to use advanced weapons technology within the conflict, at times with 
tragic results. Advancing weapons technology has given the ISAF the ability to respond to bullets 
with bombs. Resentment and anger have grown increasingly strong over the decade of war due to the 
accidental, but consistent, killing of Afghan civilians by foreign forces (Moore 2011; Sommerville 
2011). The U.K. Ministry of Defence spokesperson has stated: “any incident involving civilian 
casualties is a matter of deep regret and we take every possible measure to avoid such incidents” 
(Hopkins 2011b).  
 
The strategic, legal and ethical perspectives that have been identified in this thesis each cast different 
light upon the significance of developing weapons technology. However, overall there seems to be 
more harmony than discord. These are essentially interconnected fields and the issues around 
advancing weapons technology cannot be fully separated. The implementation of advancing weapons 
technology in Afghanistan has caused debates that are of equal significance within the legal, strategic 
and ethical perspectives. While the debates discussed within this research are interrelated, it is clear 
that a significant variety of debates can result from the development of a single weapons technology. 
The implementation of UCAV systems, for example, caused debate within the legal perspective as to 
the weapons adherence to the IHL. Strategically it is the capability of the weapon and how that can 
result in further advantage that is of upmost importance. On the other hand, the ethical perspective 
looks at the moral ramifications of killing without being in danger and continuing weapons research. 
These debates are related as they all stem from the implementation of advancing weapons technology 
and should be considered as of equal importance; however, each perspective discusses the issue with a 
different focus. Investigating the effects of advancing weapons technology from just one perspective 
would limit the debate and would not give a comprehensive understanding. 
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Influence and Interaction 
The debates discussed within the three perspectives have significant distinctions between them. Each 
perspective has a unique focus and emphasis on what is significant or important within warfare and 
weapons development. During conflict an action could be justified as strategically valuable and lawful 
but not ethically acceptable. One example can be identified in the statement by General Mueller who 
described U.S. UCAV strikes as typically occurring “when troops were caught in firefights or the 
drones came across people who appeared to be planting homemade bombs, the biggest source of 
allied casualties” (Drew 2010a). Striking a combatant as they planted a bomb would be seen as 
strategically valuable as they prevent future casualties. It also demonstrates the enormous strategic 
benefits of maintaining surveillance on a suspect and the ability to strike without warning. Legally 
this would be a valid operation as they comply with the principles of proportionality, discrimination 
and military necessity.
28
 However, ethically there are still issues that are not being addressed. As 
discussed in the previous chapter it can be argued that killing enemy combatants, using UCAVs while 
the operator is not within the conflict area, is the moral equivalent of murder. Also, the suspect is not 
given a chance to surrender. This is ethically questionable but can be considered legal as the 
combatant forfeited many legal protections by actively engaging in the conflict. These kinds of strikes 
show that the strategic advantages gained have so far outweighed any challenging ethical or legal 
arguments that have been put forward. Individually, the objections raised within each perspective are 
not influential enough to make the U.S. rethink its use of weapons technology within conflict. 
Objections would need to be supported from within all three perspectives to gain the level of 
credibility needed to instigate significant public interest. Without support from those within the field 
of strategy and law it is unlikely that any ethical objection will gain a level of public interest that is 
significant enough to impact on the deployment of UCAV or PGM technology. 
 
That said, the development of COIN warfare represents recognition of the need to incorporate IHL 
and ethical concerns into contemporary military strategies. The increasingly similar goals of the three 
perspectives can be perceived as a “fortuitous coming together of technology and morality” (Zehfuss 
2010: 5). As new technologies and strategies are utilised it is the public and military reaction to the 
event, either positive or negative, that creates new standards of legitimate and ethical practice. In 
order to inspire a positive reaction new technologies are often described using sympathetic 
humanitarian rhetoric, and as a consequence the legal, ethical and strategic perspectives are 
increasingly using the same humanitarian language. The use of humanitarian language to describe 
conflicts that utilise new weapons technology has been ethically questioned. The moral convictions 
behind actions, especially when deemed humanitarian, are called into question when the intervening 
                                                     
28 Assuming the strike is not taking place in a heavily populated area or unnecessarily endangering civilians.  
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state prioritises the safety of its soldiers by using new weapons technology. This is arguably seen in 
Afghanistan as it has been claimed that ground troops would have been more effective, and caused 
fewer civilian deaths, than the deployment of advanced weapons systems (Zehfuss 2010: 11). COIN 
warfare attempts to combat this argument as it is made clear within the COIN manual that civilian 
lives are to be prioritised and discrimination used at all times: 
The principles of discrimination in the use of force and proportionality in actions are 
important to counterinsurgents for practical reasons as well as for their ethical or moral 
implications [...] The use of discriminating, proportionate force as a mindset goes beyond 
the adherence to the rules of engagement. Proportionality and discrimination applied in 
COIN require leaders to ensure that their units employ the right tools correctly with 
mature discernment, good judgment and moral resolve (Departments of the Army and 
Navy 2006: 7-37). 
On the other hand, it cannot be claimed that by implementing COIN warfare the ethical and strategic 
dilemmas raised by implementing new weapons technologies have been resolved. This research 
demonstrates that while COIN warfare acknowledges the need to incorporate legal and ethical 
concerns during modern warfare, there are still many questions and dilemmas that have yet to be 
adequately addressed.  
 
Discrimination Norm 
A clear example of how advanced weapons technologies have created a context, in which legal and 
ethical concerns have become central to strategic planning, can be seen in the increasing importance 
of the discrimination norm. During the Cold War there was little regard for discrimination due to a 
reliance on nuclear deterrence (Beier 2003: 418). As demonstrated in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 
nuclear weapons do not distinguish between civilian and combatant. Since the end of the Cold War 
there has been a renaissance of discrimination values. There were several key factors that led to the 
re-emergence of the discrimination norm during the 1990s. The development of the global media 
meant that conflicts around the world could now be scrutinised as images of the destruction were 
broadcast worldwide. Several conflicts, such as those in Rwanda and Bosnia, emphasised the 
importance of human rights and need to protect innocent civilians. After witnessing such atrocities 
new weapons technologies, such as UAVs, UCAVs and PGMs, were embraced as they were seen as 
providing protection for civilians without the loss of soldiers lives. Civilian deaths still occur during 
conflict; however, they are increasingly referred to as ‘accidents’. This helps to deter criticism or 
blame as accidents occur without fault. While precision weaponry may be saving civilian lives during 
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the war in Afghanistan there is growing resentment from family and friends of those civilians who 
have lost their lives, causing them to resent and resist NATO forces. This increasing resentment 
contributes to the mounting necessity for discrimination and bringing the humanitarian goals of 
strategy, law and ethics closer together. The development of COIN warfare was, to a large extent, to 
combat this growing hatred towards the foreign forces within Afghanistan. COIN warfare is 
significant in regards to the discrimination norm as it acknowledges that civilian casualties must be 
avoided whenever possible. COIN warfare has made the discrimination norm increasingly important 
to military strategists who could have previously prioritised a decisive victory over the protection of 
civilians. Indeed, with the development of COIN warfare these two concepts are irrefutably linked as 
it is necessary not just to defeat the Taliban but also to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the Afghan 
people.  
 
New weapons technologies have had a significant impact on the discrimination norm. PGMs and 
UCAVs can now identify and destroy combatant targets, sparing civilian casualties and property. 
However, this has created the perception that the U.S. military is in control of the destruction caused 
in warfare and that a civilian casualty free war may be possible. This is an exaggeration as the 
precision capabilities of PGMs and UCAVs are, at times, overstated. While termed ‘precision’ they 
are not as accurate as would be presumed when fighting in an urban setting where a matter of metres 
could mean the difference between hitting a combatant stronghold or a civilian household. M. Schmitt 
argues that new weapons, especially PGMs, are paradoxically, a real threat to and the best hope for, 
the future of the discrimination norm (Beier 2003: 421). M. Schmitt identifies the increasing threat of 
terrorist acts on civilians for low tech forces to gain some advantage during an asymmetrical conflict 
as a significant threat to the discrimination norm. On the other hand, precision weaponry is argued as 
the best hope for the future of the discrimination norm due to its ability to identify and destroy 
combatant targets and allow closer adherence to IHL and ethical standards. 
 
The developments of new weapons technology and COIN warfare have challenged the foundation of 
IHLs - the Geneva Conventions. As discussed in Chapter 4, a new standard of legitimate practice 
during warfare has been developed. Weapons now legally adhere to the principle of discrimination to 
an extent that no previous weapons could have achieved, but this may no longer be enough to avoid 
criticism. As weapons technology advances the standards of legitimate practice are raised. Beier 
(2003: 411) identifies PGMs as setting a new standard of legitimacy in war as indiscriminate warfare 
is no longer perceived as acceptable. The increasing acceptance of PGMs clearly demonstrates how 
new weapons technology has influenced, and has been influenced by, the discrimination norm and 
other legal and ethical standards. Blanket bombing was once a widely accepted tactic during warfare 
71 
 
and was deemed legal so long as there was a legitimate military target and the operation was deemed 
proportional and necessary. However, the development of PGMs means that blanket bombing is now 
seen as barbaric. The law has not changed but what is accepted as proportional and necessary has 
evolved to incorporate the capabilities of new weapons technology. While IHL is still vital for the 
protection of civilians during warfare, the legitimate standard being set by those adhering to the 
discrimination norm goes far beyond any legal guidelines. Weapons technology has allowed for a 
closer adherence to the letter of the law but there are still ethical objections. The ability of new 
weapons technology to adhere closely to the norm of discrimination makes it difficult for ethicists to 
criticise precision weaponry, as increasing discrimination in weaponry is often ethically motivated. 
Nevertheless, it is debatable if the continued development of such weaponry can be morally justified. 
Weapons are created to destroy, so in this regard are morally repugnant. On the other hand, continued 
development has allowed for the creation of weaponry that adheres to the norm of discrimination to 
an extent not previously possible, saving lives as a consequence. 
 
The war in Afghanistan and the development of COIN warfare has shown that despite the promise of 
short wars with lessening risk to civilians, advancing weapons technology can lead to longer conflicts. 
Historically wars have been won by the force with access to the most resources. However, within 
COIN warfare advanced weapons technology is not enough to win a conflict; rather intelligence 
gathering and humanitarian actions are seen as the keys to victory. While it has not been suggested 
that humans will no longer have a place on the battlefield, the goal of bloodless war has been seen as 
an ideal to work towards by some. Such conflicts could be in danger of not addressing the underlying 
issues and therefore never definitively resolve the conflict (Enemark 2008: 203). The inability of 
technology to solve humanitarian issues was demonstrated in the war in Afghanistan by the need for 
COIN warfare. This shows that while technology will play a significant role in future conflicts, it is 
important that hi-tech states do not rely too heavily on this one aspect of warfare. 
 
Conclusion 
The three perspectives discussed within this thesis have allowed for discussion of debates that have 
arisen as a result of advancing weapons technology. The strategic perspective, discussed in chapter 3, 
focuses upon significant strategic benefits gained by implementing UCAV and PGM technology. 
While there are strategic arguments against using UCAV technology, such as the mistrust of new 
technology by some in the military, the finite amount of bandwidth over battlefields and the loss of 
cultural identity for fighter pilots, such arguments are not persuasive enough to slow down the 
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development or implementation of weapons technology. Like all aircraft there are, at times, 
mechanical malfunctions. However, the majority of errors reported have been caused by human error; 
such as through the misinterpretation of information or poor intelligence. UCAV technology provides 
manoeuvres that were previously not possible. Operators have the ability to provide long term 
surveillance on a target and strike without warning after waiting for the optimal moment. They can 
also hover and fly slowly over a battlefield providing ‘real time’ surveillance. Previously such 
manoeuvres would have put the pilot in danger and would not have been attempted. Both UCAV and 
PGM technology are cost effective compared to other available weapons systems of similar 
capabilities.  
 
The loss of civilian life is understood by many to have negative strategic consequences. The 
development of precision technology can arguably decrease the risk to civilians during conflicts. This 
is strategically advantageous as resentment for civilian deaths has led to anger and frustration at 
foreign forces in Afghanistan. Such animosity makes it harder for the ISAF to reach its goal of a 
stable and democratic Afghanistan. However, it can also be argued that a high civilian body count is 
shocking and can force a swift resolution to conflict to avoid further tragedy (C. S. Gray 2005b: 163). 
Despite the development of precision technology, and attempts to limit the amount of force being 
used, anger and frustration from within Afghanistan is growing as civilian deaths continue.  
 
New weapons technology has had a significant impact on the face of warfare, the most relevant of 
which are the increase of technological asymmetry and the development of COIN warfare. Conflicts 
have become increasingly asymmetrical as new weapons technology provides more strategic 
advantages to technological ‘have’ militaries. These advantages have not lead to a swift victory as the 
war in Afghanistan was not a traditional war fought between two armies. The Taliban strategies made 
the development of COIN warfare vital to effectively combat the insurgency. Key factors of COIN 
warfare have been added by advancing weapons technology. Intelligence gathering is vital to carry 
out a successful COIN operation. Advancing weapons technology gives the U.S. and ISAF the ability 
to process and react to information quickly, while impeding their enemies’ ability to do the same (M. 
Schmitt 2008: 8).  
 
The legal perspective, discussed in chapter 4, focuses upon the effect of advancing weapons 
technology on IHL. The Geneva Conventions are still considered the basis of international law but are 
increasingly challenged by the new strategic capabilities of weapons technology and the changing 
face of warfare. Discussion of the key principles of proportionality, discrimination and necessity show 
73 
 
that advancing weapons technology is able to comply with these laws more definitively than any 
previous weapons. New standards of legitimate practice have caused U.S. commanders to go above 
and beyond the letter of the law to protect civilian lives. These standards are currently only enforced 
by normative restraint as there is not yet a governing body capable of holding states accountable. 
Despite this the ISAF and especially U.S. forces have been criticised for the use of UCAVs. This is 
due to the use of UCAVs within Pakistan, the lack of accountability and the CIA operating UCAVs 
rather than military personal. The U.N. has called for more transparency and accountability. There 
have been some calls for the Geneva Conventions to be put aside and new standards to be put in 
place; however, no significant proposals for how this would be achieved have been put forward.  
 
Finally, as shown in chapter 5, there are many ethical debates that have become prominent due to the 
development of weapons technology. Aspects of humanitarian warfare have been questioned within 
the ethical perspective. The most controversial debate questions whether it is ethically acceptable to 
kill while not in danger. Moreover, intervening in a conflict without endangering soldiers but risking 
civilian lives demeans any claim of acting out of a moral duty. A UCAV operator is removed from the 
battlefield creating a mental and ethical distance between operator and victim. Further debates are 
centred on the capabilities of the weaponry. For example, should robots become more autonomous 
and be able to take human life without a human making the decision? While this is seen as morally 
repugnant by some it is also argued that robots can process information more effectively and could 
make decisions without emotion. What weapons technology is able to achieve depends upon weapons 
researchers and developers. While this can be perceived as an unethical endeavour it can also be 
argued as an ethical obligation. Further development of weapons technology could result in 
technology that will discriminate between combatants and civilians more accurately.  
 
Taken as a whole these varied debates show that the renaissance of discrimination values has led to 
the need to incorporate legal and ethical consideration into military strategy. This is demonstrated in 
the development of COIN warfare which prioritises civilian life and the minimal use of force. New 
weapons technology has helped the U.S. military achieve a level of discrimination during the war in 
Afghanistan that was not previously possible. Discrimination is a principle that is supported by both 
legal and ethical arguments. The development of the discrimination norm is the most significant 
consequence of new weapons development within the fields of strategy, law and ethics.  
 
As yet, there has been no objection to the use of new weapons technology that has had any significant 
traction. Criticism of military technology cannot keep up with developing technology due to the 
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secrecy of the military. There cannot be criticism of technology if it is not known to exist, it is also 
hard to criticise technology that has already been successfully implemented. Legal and ethical norms 
help to create accountability for weapons strategies that are implemented within conflict. However, 
with weapons development occurring so rapidly there is often no precedent for the use of a weapon 
nor the opportunity to discuss the impact of such technology before it is implemented. It would be 
increasingly difficult to stop the U.S. military using UCAV technology. Since its implementation in 
the war in Afghanistan UCAV technology has had a significant influence on the conflict. It is unlikely 
the U.S. military would willingly forgo utilising such a valuable resource, even if more substantial 
objections came to light. Many of the objections that have been put forward are subjective or 
ambiguous; often criticisms are ignored as a minority voice or dismissed as one interpretation of what 
are complex issues. Such issues are often easier to understand in hindsight and we can only hope that 
it will not be future generations who will suffer from a lack of current understanding or forethought. 
Currently there seems to be few limitations to weapons development apart from the need for 
discrimination. At the minimum the incorporation of legal and ethical standards into military doctrine, 
as seen by the implementation of COIN warfare, needs to be maintained and pursued further to 
develop more humanitarian warfare. 
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